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ABSTRACT 
This paper tests the hypothesis that the transition from border to domestic taxation 
over the past three decades has reduced welfare. Border taxes consist of import tariffs and 
export duties, while domestic taxation consists of value-added taxes (VATs) and general 
sales taxes (GSTs). This investigation uses Auriol and Warlters (2012) model to calculate 
the marginal cost of funds (MCF) for 106 countries across five tax instruments: domestic, 
import, export, capital, and labor. If MCF estimates for trade taxes are larger for domestic 
taxes than trade taxes welfare has been reduced by the transition to domestic taxation. 
Although MCF calculations vary between countries, the results suggest that in most 
instances welfare would be improved by increasing trade taxes and reducing factor taxes 
(taxes on labor and capital). The high MCF among factors is driven by the presence of an 
informal sector. Factor tax increases led to substitution from formal factors to informal 
factors, reducing the overall tax base. The failure of governments to equalize MCF across 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The Marginal Cost of Funds 
The MCF is the change in social welfare given an increase in tax rate of a 
particular tax instrument. Levels of MCF estimates are highly dependent on their method 
of calculation and intended to be ordinal measures. In a comparison of MCF estimates for 
two tax instruments, the higher estimate indicates a larger welfare cost given a marginal 
increase in both tax instruments. If the goal is revenue-neutral tax reform, it would be 
most efficient to lower the tax with the higher MCF and raise the tax with the lower 
MCF. This process removes distortions in the economy increases overall welfare.    
The MCF also has several other implications for governments. The MCF is the 
percentage by which benefits must exceed costs for a public expenditure project. For 
instance, a MCF estimate of 1.10 requires public expenditure projects to generate 
marginal benefits greater than 10 percent for the project to be worthwhile. By averaging 
MCF estimates across all tax instruments, one can generate a marginal benefit threshold 
for government expenditure projects. More efficient taxation lowers the MCF, in turn 
lowering the threshold required for public expenditure projects and expanding the set of 
public expenditure projects financially viable (Auriol and Warlters 2012). This is 
especially important for developing countries because of the large positive impacts that 
public expenditure projects can have.  
1
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In this equation ΔW is the change in social welfare measured in dollars and ΔR is the 
change in revenue from the change in the tax. This paper uses equivalent variation, the 
change in consumer surplus, as its measurement of welfare change.1 The two methods 
most common in the literature for calculating the MCF is differential and balanced 
budget. Differential analysis marginally increases a distortionary tax instrument while a 
lump-sum tax instrument is decreased to balance the budget. The decrease of the lump-
sum tax essentially rebates consumers for the increased tax, cancelling out the income 
effect (Auriol and Warlters 2012). The ΔW in this case depends on the compensated 
elasticities (the welfare change due to the substitution effect) while the ΔR is equal to the 
lump-sum transfer rebated to the consumer. Balanced budget analysis marginally 
increases a tax instrument and the revenue is spent on a public project. This type of 
analysis considers income effects and uses uncompensated elasticities to determine the 
MCF. This paper uses the balanced budget method, assuming the additional revenue is 
rebated to the consumer. The treatment of second round effects also influences MCF 
calculations. Second round effects are the increases in revenue due to increases in public 
1 This is consistent with Browning (1987) method cited by Fullerton (1991) in which the 
revenue change from the compensated elasticity is subtracting from the EV in order to 
remove the effect of public spending. The following formula is used in this model: Δ𝛥𝛥 =
�(w1 − 𝑤𝑤0) ∗
𝑦𝑦0
𝑤𝑤0
� − Δ𝛥𝛥 where Δ𝛥𝛥 is the change in welfare, 𝑤𝑤0 is the initial welfare 
measure, 𝑤𝑤1 is the secondary welfare measure, 𝑦𝑦0 is initial income, and Δ𝛥𝛥 is the change 
in revenue.   
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spending.  These should not be considered in MCF calculations as they are the result of 
public spending decisions and not necessarily the particular tax instrument (Auriol and 
Warlters 2012). This model ignores the second round effects of tax revenue. Regardless, 
consistency between measurements is essential – MCF is an ordinal measurement, so 
while model choices will impact the levels of the MCF, calculations should not influence 
the relative MCF estimates between instruments. This model ignores second round 
effects of tax revenue. 
Global Trends in Tax Structure 
Over the past three decades, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
structural adjustment and stabilization policies have led developing countries to reduce 
traditional and non-traditional trade barriers (Emran and Stiglitz 2005). Nearly 30 percent 
of the World Bank’s adjustment lending was conditional on trade policy in 1989, 
providing a strong incentive for developing countries to first convert quotas and licensing 
restrictions to tariffs which they then began to ratchet down (Mitra 1992). From 1981 to 
2010, average tariffs worldwide have fallen 16 percentage points from 24 to 8 percent. 
This includes an average of 20 percentage point decrease in average tariff rates among 
low income and developing countries. The global trends in tariff reductions are illustrated 
in Figure 1. 
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Data from Ng (2011) 
There has been a consistent and precipitous decline in tariff rates from 1981 
through 2010, especially among developing countries. There has been significant debate 
in the literature as to whether this trend has increased welfare. In 1998, import taxes had 
constituted 26 percent of Sub-Saharan African tax revenue (compared with only 2 percent 
in the industrialized world). Despite the reforms, trade taxes still account for 
approximately 20 percent of revenues in many developing countries (Keen 2008). To 
compensate for these revenue losses, developing countries attempted to broaden their tax 
bases through VAT and GST implementation. These reforms have largely failed to 
compensate for the lost revenue with Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) estimating that 
developing countries recovered no more than 30 percent of revenue lost to trade related 








1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Figure 1.1: Average Tariff Rates from 1981 - 2010
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countries as a result of these reforms. For instance, Latin American countries have an 
average gap of 12.69 percentage points between their tax collection and that of wealthy 
OECD countries as a percentage of GDP. This comes at a time when tax revenue is of 
increased importance for developing and low income countries given the poor fiscal 
health of many developed countries and their resulting reduced provision of aid (Auriol 
and Warlters 2012). 
This paper evaluates the welfare effects of country tax structures using MCF 
calculations. Producing MCF calculations generally require complex and data intensive 
calculable general equilibrium (CGE) models and have largely only been calculated for 
developed countries. It is not possible to compare these estimates across countries due to 
the range of modeling techniques used, which are largely influenced by country-specific 
data constraints. To skirt these constraints this paper borrows a CGE model from Auriol 
and Warlters (2012) which calculates the MCF across 38 countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. This model uses basic national account and tax rate data to evaluate five major tax 
categories: domestic, import, export, capital, and labor. Domestic taxes include VATs 
and GSTs. Import taxes account for import tariffs while export taxes account for export 
duties. Capital taxes are those paid by corporations on profits and capital gains. Labor 
taxes are income, capital gains, and payroll taxes paid by individuals. These definitions 
correspond to the data categories in the IMF databases used to compile the data for this 
study.  
One hurdle in estimating the MCF for developing countries is the presence of a 
large, untaxed, informal sector. Auriol and Warlters (2012) estimate that untaxed goods 
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represent 35 percent of GDP in Sub-Saharan African countries, while untaxed factor 
payments represent 56 percent of GDP. Inclusion of the informal sector is important to 
allow for computation of taxes on domestic goods using the legal rates in each country 
(rather than effective rates) by allowing producers to shift between the formal and 
informal sector. A greater elasticity of substitution between the informal and formal 
sectors yields a greater welfare loss as production shifts to the informal sector with an 
increase in taxes.  
Auriol and Warlters find that across all instruments, the average MCF for the 28 
Sub-Saharan African countries in their sample is 1.21.  Average taxes on consumption 
goods (domestically produced goods and imports) are found to have comparatively low 
MCF (on average 1.11 and 1.18, respectively while taxes on capital and labor have high 
MCFs (on average 1.60 and 1.51, respectively). This would suggest that welfare could be 
improved by reducing factor taxes and increasing consumption and import taxes. It 
should be noted that there is significant variation among countries, making tax reform 
more efficient for some countries than others. Auriol and Warlters also take 
administrative costs into account, finding it is unlikely they would alter which taxes are 
most efficient by including the cost of collecting said taxes. The administrative cost of 
domestic taxation (that is the broad based consumption tax) would have to exceed 8 
percent of revenue for it to have a higher MCF than import MCF, 28 percent to exceed 
the labor MCF, and 32 percent to exceed capital MCF – all quite unlikely.  
Auriol and Warlters conclude that, on average, it is most efficient to have a VAT, 
small import tariffs, and no taxation on exports. To expand revenues countries should 
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work to incorporate more of the informal or untaxed economy into the formal economy, 
broadening the coverage of VATs. Auriol and Warlters ultimately support the 
suggestions of the IMF and World Bank to implement VAT schemes. 
By extending the Auriol and Warlters model to 106 additional countries this paper 
hopes to expand the number of countries for which MCF estimates exist. This will also 
allow for broad conclusions to be drawn by comparing the MCF of multiple countries. 
This paper endeavors to answer whether, in general, welfare could be improved by 
increasing trade taxes and lowering domestic taxes. This would suggest that the IMF and 
World Bank inspired reforms of the past three decades have been welfare reducing.  
Evidence from the Literature 
The literature examining the welfare impacts of trade tax reform is extensive. 
Most research has focused on examining the dual reduction in trade taxes and increase in 
broad based consumption or sales taxes. The studies have largely focused on developed 
countries and the subsequent results have been extrapolated to cover developing 
countries. When studies are conducted using partial equilibrium analysis of VATs, the 
results have largely found them to be welfare enhancing because broad based taxes 
minimize distortions. When this question is investigated using CGE modelling, which 
incorporates both formal and informal sectors, the assumption of VAT welfare 
improvement does not necessarily hold. Piggott and Whalley (2001), Emran and Stiglitz 
(2005), Stiglitz (2009) and Munk (2008) find that the implementation of broad based 
taxation to supplement lost revenues from trade tax reform is welfare reducing largely 
due to these informal sectors.  
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The informal sector constitutes all economic activity that would be taxable had it 
been reported to the state (Schneider 2002). Schneider estimates that the informal sector 
constitutes 41 percent of gross national income (GNI) in developing countries, 38 percent 
of GNI in transition countries, and 18 percent in OECD countries (as of 2000). Schneider 
cites increases in taxation and social security contributions as main contributing factors to 
the growth of the informal economy due to their distortion of worker labor-leisure 
decisions. The greater the discrepancy between formal and informal wages as a result of 
the tax, the more workers will shift to the informal economy.  
Piggott and Whalley (2001) construct a general equilibrium model to evaluate 
how the change from narrow to broad based taxation impacts supply decisions in formal 
and informal sectors using data from Canada’s 1990 VAT implementation. Whereas, 
under the prior regime taxation was narrowly focused on sectors like manufacturing, 
VAT and GST implimentation brought several other services under taxation. In the 
informal sector these services are provided by smaller, more inefficient groups. Piggott 
and Whalley provide the example of small-scale construction which is provided by small 
groups in the informal economy, generating further inefficiencies. As primary providers 
of informal goods and services, the poor do benefit from the substitution towards the 
informal market, as the broad based tax on the formal sector creates an effective tariff on 
formal service provision. Although VAT implementation engendered positive 
distributional effects for the poorest Canadians, aggregate welfare was reduced.  
Emran and Stiglitz (2005) broaden Piggott and Whalley’s analysis to examine the 
impact of a revenue-neutral shift from trade taxes to a VAT in a developing economy 
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with a large informal sector, where there is not perfect substitution between informal and 
formal sectors. The model consists of a small open economy being endowed with a 
vector of fixed factors. Commodities are all tradable and can be separated into four 
groups depending on whether it is formally or informally produced or importable or 
exportable. Emran and Stiglitz use this framework to decrease the tax on imported goods, 
offsetting it with a broadening of the VAT. They find attempted tax broadening to be 
welfare reducing due to the imperfect coverage of the VAT attributable to the large 
informal sector. Emran and Stiglitz conclude by questioning the wisdom of WTO and 
IMF reforms reducing trade taxes and increasing domestic taxes. The paper also finds 
that even after tariff reduction, a large portion of tax revenue comes from VAT collected 
at the border (essentially a pseudo-tariff tax). Emran and Stiglitz argue that if this is the 
efficient outcome advocated for by the WTO and IMF, perhaps the border taxes 
themselves were not as inefficient as suggested. Emran and Stiglitz’s work suffers from 
one limitation in that they assume that a VAT paid on intermediary goods in the informal 
sector is reimbursed, when in fact this does not occur. This would yield larger welfare 
losses in their analysis than what actually occurs.  
Stiglitz (2009) provides further insight on the issues of trade tax adjustment in his 
working paper. He finds that administrative costs, in addition to the presence of a large 
informal sector, can make the switch from border to indirect taxation welfare reducing. 
He also argues that the VAT may have adverse distributional effects, contrary to Piggott 
and Whalley (2001) who found the poor benefited from the tax on formal provision of 
services. While OECD countries can enhance welfare by using specific redistributive 
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programs to achieve equity goals, these programs may not exist in developing countries. 
The cost of implementing such programs can also be large, leading Stiglitz to argue that it 
may be more efficient to achieve equity goals through taxation in some countries. The 
VAT is not effective in this role because it is highly distortionary in developing 
economies and is only collected on an estimated 50 percent of the economy. This 
encourages movement into the informal economy. Stiglitz also argues that there may be a 
larger role for efficient corrective taxation in developing countries, where market failures 
are more prevalent. He also suggests that a VAT could lower growth in a developing 
economy. He proposes a model with two sectors, formal and informal. The formal sector 
is assumed to have a higher rate of productivity growth than the informal sector. The 
imposition of a VAT results in the misallocation of labor into the lower-performing 
informal sector, restricting a country’s growth. The VAT is largely enforced in urban 
areas where it is easier to administer as opposed to rural areas. This could cause improper 
allocation of labor to rural areas where it may be used inefficiently.  
Corruption is another issue in many of these developing countries due to the lack 
of visibility or information costs associated with taxation. While developed countries 
standardized procedures for accounting and systems of receipts, such standardization is 
less institutionalized in developing countries. This paper is limited in that It does not 
address corruption outright. Stiglitz also suggests the use of simple models which assume 
away oligopoly, incomplete markets, monopolistic competition, and incomplete 
information (quite common assumptions) are inherently problematic because these 
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factors play a much larger role in developing economies, and therefore must be taken into 
account. 
For these reasons, Stiglitz is perhaps the literature’s most ardent detractor from 
the idea of welfare enhancement through base broadening taxation. Munk (2008) 
evaluates the competing claims by Stiglitz and arguments by the IMF and World Bank 
arguing that the trade tax reforms are welfare enhancing. He models a small open 
economy with domestic and border taxes, a formal and informal sector, and tax schemes 
with different administrative costs. Where Emran and Stiglitz (2005) incorrectly applied 
the VAT to both formal and informal sector intermediate goods, Munk applied it only to 
those in the formal sector. The model consists of three commodities: manufactured 
goods, cash crops, and food, which are consumed domestically and traded. A household 
then derives utility from consumption of these goods and leisure in both the formal and 
informal sector. The model is used to conduct four tax simulations. In the first only a 
uniform VAT is implemented. The second allows for differential commodity taxation. 
The third applies a uniform rate VAT and border taxes. The fourth applies only border 
taxes. The model also accounts for the administrative costs of the different tax structures. 
Munk concludes that the efficiency of border taxes is dependent on the size of the 
informal sector and the administrative costs, on which more research is required. The 
model suggests Stiglitz’s claims are plausible and the trade tax adjustment process may 
be welfare reducing.  
Keen (2008) argues that the VAT can be welfare enhancing even with a large 
informal sector when particular attention is paid to how it operates. He contests that while 
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most theorists treat the VAT as a final consumption tax, that the VAT only functions as a 
consumption tax if the chain of rebates is complete throughout the value-added process 
up until its sale to a final consumer. This chain is broken when formal sector producers 
use informal sector inputs. They are not able to rebate the value of these inputs, creating 
an effective tax on informal inputs. Thus, an informal sector trader relinquishes the 
opportunity to rebate prior transactions. This is largely ignored in the literature finding 
the VAT to be welfare reducing (including Emran and Stiglitz 2005). Keen’s work does 
have several deficiencies, one of which is a failure to take administrative costs into 
account.   
Keen and Lockwood (2010) provide an empirical analysis using panel data on 143 
countries over 25 years they are able to estimate which countries are most likely to adopt 
the VAT as well as the impact of the implementation itself on revenue. The study finds 
VAT implementation to have positive implications for revenue in most countries (an 
approximate 3.4 percent increase in the revenue to Gross Domestic Output (GDO) ratio), 
but singles out Sub-Saharan Africa as a region with more mixed results. Ebeke and 
Ehrhart (2011) evaluate 103 developing countries from 1980 to 2008 finding that they 
collect, on average, 40 to 50 percent lower revenues with a VAT than without one. 
However, these revenues are more stable than other tax policies. They find that this gap 
decreases given increased economic development and trade openness. The costs of 
unstable taxation policies and costs of borrowing money must be considered in evaluating 
any taxation scheme. Revenue consistency is certainly an important consideration in 
countries where development is largely contingent on government sponsored projects. 
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Governments in Sub-Saharan Africa also have limited access to capital markets, and 
when they do borrowing it is often expensive.2 Budget shortfalls can saddle these 
countries with large debt burdens.  
 The literature suggests that administrative costs and the presence of large informal 
sectors in developing countries may cause the transition from border taxes to VATs and 
GSTs may not be efficient for developing economies. While the effects are somewhat 
mitigated because informal sector participants do not have the benefit of rebating VATs 
imposed earlier in the value chain, there can still be a significant misallocation of labor in 
resources as a result of the tax’s uneven application. Further considerations such as 





                                                 
2  For example, a July 24th, 2015 issue of 182 day bills by Ghana’s Central Bank had 
interest rates of 25.89 percent. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DATA AND VARIABLES 
This paper borrows a model from Auriol and Warlters to calculate the MCF. The 
data requirements in the model are shown in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1: Data Requirements 
Variable  Description Source 
𝐸𝐸 Exports (% of GDP)  IMF, World Bank, MIT OEC 
𝑀𝑀 Imports (% of GDP) IMF, World Bank, MIT OEC 
𝐼𝐼 Investment (% of GDP) IMF, World Bank, MIT OEC 
𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷 Tax revenue from VATs and sales taxes (% of GDP) IMF, OECD 
𝛥𝛥𝐸𝐸 Tax revenue from export taxes (% of GDP) IMF, OECD 
𝛥𝛥𝑀𝑀 Tax revenue from import taxes (% of GDP) IMF, OECD 
𝛥𝛥𝐾𝐾 Tax revenue from capital taxes (% of GDP) IMF, OECD 
𝛥𝛥𝐿𝐿 Tax revenue from labor taxes (% of GDP) IMF, OECD 
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 Tax rate on domestic goods and services (VAT or GST rate) Ernest and Young, KPMG, Deloitte, PWC 
𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾 Tax rate on capital (corporate tax rate) Ernest and Young, KPMG, Deloitte, PWC 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿 Tax rate on labor (income tax rate) Ernest and Young, KPMG, Deloitte, PWC 
𝛼𝛼𝑈𝑈 Labor-output ratio in production of untaxed  Set at 0.30 
Domestic tax revenue includes revenues from VAT or GST, depending upon the tax 
system used in the country. No distinction is made in the model between these two 
instruments. Labor taxes are income and capital gain taxes attributable to individuals and 
any payroll taxes. Labor taxes do not include any social security payments – these are not 
built into the model and are one of its limitations. Capital revenue includes income and 
capital gains taxes attributable to corporations. It should be noted that the capital taxes 
section does not include land taxes. Import tax revenue is revenue attributable to import 
tariffs. These taxes are supplementary to value-added and sales taxes, which are also 
applied to imported goods consumed in a given country. Export taxes include export 
duties which are charged to goods leaving the country. In most circumstances, VATs for 
exported goods are rebated while VATs on imported goods are not. The original Auriol 
and Warlters analysis uses data from IMF country report statistical annexes which 
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included national account data and tax revenue as a percentage of GDP disaggregated by 
tax type. Very few of these reports are available and those that were are outdated, so this 
paper draws its data from several sources. National accounts and government revenue 
data is taken from the IMF Government Financial Statistics (GFS) database. Missing data 
was supplemented from the World Bank online database. Individual tax rates are taken 
from the annual tax guides of Ernest and Young, Deloitte, KPMG, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. Where tax rates for a particular country were not found, several 
sources were used to verify the accurate rate including country-specific revenue authority 
websites, the Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Database, and the World Bank’s 
Doing Business database. For countries with progressive income tax rates, every attempt 
was made to select the middle rate which was chosen and used as the marginal rate. 
When tax schemes had even numbers of rates, the lowest middle rate was chosen. These 
rates were chosen to best match the marginal tax rate faced by the average citizen. GDP 
per capita data was taken from World Bank, IMF, and United Nations databases as 
available. Table 1.2 shows that data collection for Sub-Saharan Africa draws similar 
averages to the Auriol and Warlters paper despite different countries being used in the 
respective samples.  
Table 1.2: Comparing Averages of Sub-Saharan African Data 
𝐸𝐸 𝑀𝑀 𝐼𝐼 𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷 𝛥𝛥𝐸𝐸 𝛥𝛥𝑀𝑀 𝛥𝛥𝐾𝐾 𝛥𝛥𝐿𝐿 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 
Author's Data 36.36 48.49 23.60 3.82 0.38 2.88 2.72 2.69 0.15 0.29 0.26 1775 
Auriol and 
Warlters Data 31.80 38.80 20.10 2.90 0.20 6.40 2.30 2.20 0.16 0.32 0.27 907 
The original Auriol and Warlters paper used social accounting matrices from the 
International Food Policy Research Institute to calculate the labor share of domestic, 
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exports, and imports for the model. These SAMs are not available for each country 
studied in this paper. To allow for standard comparison, the labor output ratios are 
assumed to be constant across all countries and between formal, exports, and informal 
goods and is set at 0.30. In the absence of other data, this is an acceptable estimate given 
its common use as the labor share of output. The data is broken up by country into seven 
groups for further analysis: Developed, Emerging Europe, Developing Asia, Latin 




Formulas and Descriptions 
To solve for each of these account values, a series of formulas is applied to the 
input data. The output of each sector is then calculated by dividing tax revenue by the 
legal tax rate. Thus, the size of domestic is calculated by dividing domestic tax revenue 
as a percent of GDP by the domestic tax rate. Domestic represents the formal economy 
subject to domestic taxation (such as a VAT or GST). The size of the informal sector is 
what remains from GDP after domestic, exports, and goods taxes are subtracted out 
(taking into account the baseline GDP adjustment which will be addressed). Imports are 
separated into consumption and investment in accordance with their share in the national 
accounts. The model is then calibrated by first setting elasticities in all CES functions 
equal to one. The formulas used for this calibration process are shown in Table 2.1. 
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Production of domestic 
𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸 = 𝐸𝐸 − 𝛥𝛥𝐸𝐸 Production of exports 
𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀 = 𝑀𝑀− 𝛥𝛥𝑀𝑀 Production of imports 
𝐴𝐴 = 𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀 − 𝐸𝐸 Foreign exchange 
𝑀𝑀 = 150∗ − 𝐼𝐼 − (𝐸𝐸 −𝑀𝑀) Consumption 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶 = 𝑀𝑀 ∗
𝑀𝑀
𝑀𝑀 + 𝐼𝐼
Share of imports consumed 
𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈 = 𝑀𝑀 −𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶 − 𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷 − 𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷 Production of untaxed 
𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼 = 𝑀𝑀 ∗
𝐼𝐼
𝑀𝑀 + 𝐼𝐼
Imports input into investment good 
𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁 = (𝐼𝐼 −𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼) ∗
𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈
𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈 + 𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷
Untaxed input into investment good 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁 = (𝐼𝐼 −𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼) ∗
𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷
𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈 + 𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷
Domestic input into investment good 
𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈 = 𝐼𝐼 ∗
𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈 + 𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁
𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈 + 𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁 + 𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷 + 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁 + 𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸
 
Investment in untaxed production 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸 = 𝐼𝐼 ∗
𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷 + 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁 + 𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸
𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈 + 𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁 + 𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷 + 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁 + 𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸
 





























𝑓𝑓  Cost of formal factors 
𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹 = 𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷 + 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁 + 𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸 − 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸 Sales of formal output, less investment costs 
𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 = 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹 − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 𝛥𝛥𝐾𝐾 − 𝛥𝛥𝐿𝐿 Funds distributed to informal factors in formal sector 





Informal capital used to produce domestic 





Informal capital used to produce exports 





Informal labor used to produce domestic 





Informal labor used to produce domestic 
𝐾𝐾𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑈𝑈)(𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈 + 𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁 − 𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈) Informal capital used to produce untaxed 
𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑈𝑈(𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈 + 𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁 − 𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈) Informal labor used to produce untaxed 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 = 𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷 + 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁 − �𝐾𝐾𝐷𝐷
𝑓𝑓 +𝐾𝐾𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷
𝑓𝑓 + 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 +
𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷 + 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁




𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷 + 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁 + 𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸
𝛥𝛥𝐿𝐿� 
Investment in domestic 
𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 = 𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸 − �𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸
𝑓𝑓 +𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸
𝑓𝑓 + 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 +
𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸
𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷 + 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁 + 𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸
𝛥𝛥𝐾𝐾 +
𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸
𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷 + 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁 + 𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸
𝛥𝛥𝐿𝐿� 
Investment in exports 
𝐾𝐾 = 𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸
𝑓𝑓 +𝐾𝐾𝐷𝐷
𝑓𝑓 + 𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 +𝐾𝐾𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝐾𝐾𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 Total capital initial calibrated amount 
𝐿𝐿 = 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸
𝑓𝑓 + 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷
𝑓𝑓 + 𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 +𝐾𝐾𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝐾𝐾𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  Total capital initial calibrated amount 
𝑇𝑇 = 𝜖𝜖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 Initial calibrated amount of time, where 𝜖𝜖𝐿𝐿  is 








Tax rate on imports 
* Change in value from 100 to 150 explained in calibration section. 
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Social Accounting Matrices 
The relationship between each account in the CGE model can be represented in 
social accounting matrix (SAM). SAMs represent the accounts for a specific country, 
where all numbers are expressed as products of quantities and values as a percentage of 
GDP. Each row and column in the SAM sum to zero reflecting a Walrasian equilibrium, 
where all incomes equal expenditures.  In goods columns, positive values in the SAM are 
factor amounts while negative values are expenditures or investments. In the government 
account, positive values are tax revenues while negative values are rebates to consumers. 
The foreign column represents the purchase of exports and the sale of imports using 
foreign exchange. Note that this SAM differs from a standard square input-output table 
because it contains summed columns. The columns represent the final demand accounts 
which consolidate the different factors.  The rectangular nature of the SAM exists only 
because of its disaggregation. For instance, in this SAM there are 14 rows and eight 
columns due to the disaggregation of input factors into formal and informal and the 
disaggregation of tax revenue between factors and goods. The SAM for Uruguay is 
shown in Table 3.3: 
Table 3.3: SAM for Uruguay 
Consumer Untaxed Domestic Exports Imports Investment Foreign Gov't 
Untaxed -44.7 44.7 
Domestic  -58.9 48.3 10.6 
Exports 27.3 -27.3 0.0 
Imports -24.8 28.3 -4.6 1.1 
FX 0.9 -28.3 27.3 
Inv. Inputs 9.1 9.9 -19.0 
Investment Good -9.1 -9.8 -4.6 23.6 
Informal Capital 75.5 -31.3 -30.1 -14.1 
Formal Capital 21.2 -14.4 -6.8 
Informal Labor 13.7 -13.4 -0.2 -0.1 
Formal Labor 0.1 -0.1 0.0 
Capital Taxes -3.6 -1.7 5.3 
Labor Taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Transfers 17.1 -17.1 
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The SAM indicates Uruguay has an initial formal capital amount of 21.2 percent of GDP 
and an initial formal labor amount 0.1 percent of GDP. The informal sector is comprised 
of 75.5 percent of GDP in informal capital and 13.7 percent in formal labor. The 
representative consumer is endowed with 0.9 percent of GDP in foreign exchange which 
can be used to purchase imports. Government revenue constitutes 17.1 percent of GDP, 
which is rebated to the consumer in a lump-sum transfer. It is typical of SAMs in CGE 
models not to accurately effect the real values, however this is necessary for the model to 
properly work (Auriol and Warlters 2012).  
The Informal Sector 
The informal sector size is derived by subtracting imports consumed, domestic, 
and revenue from domestic goods from total consumption. Due to the intricacies of CGE 
models and the variation in input data across countries, errors with the calibration process 
can occur. The most significant problem encountered was the calibration of negative 
informal production and negative informal factor levels. Auriol and Warlters (2005) 
explain these errors as results of re-exportation of imports and calibration of untaxed. Re-
exports are imports which are immediately exported without any value-added. Given that 
non-imports are calculated 𝑁𝑁 = 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 − 𝐼𝐼 − 𝐸𝐸, an increase in re-exports will increase E 
while I and GDP remain the same resulting in a reduction in non-imports. The untaxed 
sector is calculated 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝐺, so with sufficient re-exports the untaxed sector can 
become negative. While Auriol and Warlters admit that re-exports are not large enough to 
be wholly responsible for underestimating of the informal sector, they are a contributing 
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factor.3 They explain that the calibration process for domestic can also contribute to 
negative untaxed. Domestic is calibrated by dividing domestic revenues by the rate, 
which if small can inflate the domestic sector resulting in small or negative untaxed 
sectors. Both labor and capital are calculated in a similar fashion, so any small tax rates 
can result in negative informal factors. Auriol and Warlters solve this problem by 
allowing the market value of GDP to exceed 100 percent. To follow this convention, the 
base GDP for calculations is set to 150 preventing negative informal sector calibration. 
This allowed the GAMS MPSG computer program to compute MCF across all 
instruments for each model specification without incident. There are several countries for 
which the baseline GDP increase from 100 to 150 was not sufficient in preventing 
negative untaxed calculations. MCF calculations could not be performed for these 
countries as they would return negative values.  
Of the 106 countries in the sample, 68 did not require the baseline GDP increase 
to yield positive informal sector calibrations. To test if increasing the baseline GDP had 
significant distortionary effect on the MCF calculations, the 68 country sample was 
isolated and run with and without the baseline GDP increase. To evaluate if the ordering 
of the MCF for the tax instruments was impacted by this adjustment, the MCF for each 
instrument was ranked from highest to lowest for each country. Of the 68 countries 
3 Golub and Mbaye (2008) estimate re-exports in Gambia from 1966 to 2005 finding they 
ranged from 5 to 45 percent of GDP over that period. This suggests that re-exports could 
have an effect larger then that anticipated by Auriol and Warlters, although more research 
on the topic is needed. 
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tested, 39 did not see a change in ordering as a result of the baseline GDP adjustment. 
The instrument-specific results are shown in the table XX.  
Table 2.3: Rank Ordering Consistency 
Instrument RANK(D) RANK(M) RANK(E)  RANK(K) RANK(L) 
Number correct 60 48 46 59 56 
Percent 88% 71% 68% 87% 82% 
Of the 68 observations in this sample, the ranking of MCF(D) matched between the two 
models for 60 observations or 88 percent. Rankings of the MCF(M) and MCF(E) match 
the lowest of all the instruments at 71 percent and 68 percent, respectively. This is 
attributable to closeness in magnitude for the trade tax instruments which can often result 
in their rankings switching while the remaining instruments remain the same (the 
rankings for domestic, capital and labor alone were consistent between the two models 75 
percent of the time). The strong relationship between the models and their consistency in 
predicting the ordering supports the use of adjusted GDP baseline to accommodate 
additional countries that would otherwise have negative calibrated informal sectors (and 
thus prevent the model from properly running). The calibrated values of the untaxed 
sector for the 106 baseline GDP adjusted countries are shown next to informal sector 
estimates from Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010) in the appendix. It should be 
noted that the size of the informal sector differs greatly between these two measurements 
(this will be elaborated on when discussing the informal sector). The calibrated values of 
the untaxed sector for the 68 countries that did not require baseline GDP adjustment are 
also shown next to Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010) data in the appendix. 




Formulas, Functions, and Explanations 
The model used to estimate the MCF is borrowed from Auriol and Warlters 
(2012). A representative consumer is endowed with leisure (which can be converted into 
labor), capital, and foreign exchange (which can be used to purchase imports). The 
representative consumer’s income, 𝑌𝑌, is given as:  
𝑌𝑌 = 𝐺𝐺 + 𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 + 𝐺𝐺𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 + 𝛥𝛥 
where 𝐺𝐺 is foreign exchange inital calibrated amount, 𝑇𝑇 is the time inital calibrated 
amount, 𝐾𝐾 is the capital inital calibrated amount, 𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 is the price of labor or wage rate, and 
𝐺𝐺𝐾𝐾 is the price of capital or rental rate. 𝛥𝛥 is the lump-sum rebate of all tax revenue from 
the government. This is equivalent to the government spending tax revenue on a public 
project which then yields a return to the representative consumer. The time inital 
calibrated amount is defined 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑍𝑍 + 𝐿𝐿 where 𝑍𝑍 is leisure and 𝐿𝐿 is labor.  
The representative consumer maximizes a CES utility function by consuming four 
goods: leisure (𝑍𝑍), untaxed (𝑈𝑈), domestic (𝐺𝐺), and imports (𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐):  
𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀 𝑉𝑉 = 𝑉𝑉(𝑍𝑍,𝑈𝑈,𝐺𝐺,𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐) 
subject to the following constraint: 
𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑍𝑍 + 𝐺𝐺�𝑢𝑢𝑈𝑈 + 𝐺𝐺�𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺 + 𝐺𝐺�𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ≤ 𝑌𝑌 
where a tilde over the price indicates that it is tax-inclusive: 






The data used in this model is percentages of GDP, only the total values of goods and 
services are observed (price times quantity). Units are chosen so that quantities equal 
values and initial prices are set equal to one. When taxes are imposed, units are changed 
so that the after tax price is equal to one.  













Three final goods are produced inside the economy: untaxed (𝑈𝑈), domestic (𝐺𝐺), 
and exports (𝐸𝐸). These goods are produced with four factors of production: formal 
capital 𝐾𝐾𝑓𝑓, informal capital 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖, formal labor 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓, and informal labor 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖. This allows for 
substitution between formal and informal factors and thus allows for deadweight losses to 
occur from factor taxation. One intermediate good, investment (𝐼𝐼), is produced and used 
as an input into domestic, exports, and untaxed. Intermediate goods for untaxed (𝜓𝜓𝑈𝑈), 
domestic (𝜓𝜓𝐷𝐷), and exports (𝜓𝜓𝐸𝐸)are produced using labor, capital and investment. Factor 
are defined as 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟
𝑞𝑞 where factor 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿} for good 𝑟𝑟 ∈ {𝑈𝑈,𝐺𝐺,𝐸𝐸} of type 𝑞𝑞 ∈ {𝑖𝑖,𝑓𝑓} 
indicating if the factor is informal (𝑖𝑖) or formal (𝑓𝑓): 
𝜓𝜓𝑈𝑈 = 𝛾𝛾𝑈𝑈(𝐾𝐾𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 , 𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈) 
𝜓𝜓𝐷𝐷 = 𝛾𝛾𝐷𝐷(𝐾𝐾𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝐾𝐾𝐷𝐷
𝑓𝑓 , 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 , 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷
𝑓𝑓 , 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷)
𝜓𝜓𝐸𝐸 = 𝛾𝛾𝐸𝐸(𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸
𝑓𝑓 , 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸
𝑓𝑓 , 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸)
Note that the untaxed good is only produced with informal capital, labor, and 
investment while the domestic and exported goods can be produced with both formal and 
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informal factors. The first order conditions determining factor usage, investment usage, 

















 where 𝑀𝑀 ∈ {𝑀𝑀,𝑁𝑁} 
Where investment is composed of investment inputs: 
𝐼𝐼 = 𝜓𝜓𝐸𝐸(𝑀𝑀,𝑁𝑁) 
Intermediate goods are divided between final output and intermediate investment 
inputs using CET production functions:  
𝜓𝜓𝑈𝑈 = 𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈(𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈,𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈) 
𝜓𝜓𝐷𝐷 = 𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷(𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷,𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷) 
The value of imports are equal to the value of exports and the inital calibrated 
amount of foreign exchange:  
𝐺𝐺�𝑀𝑀𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀 = 𝐺𝐺�𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀 + 𝐴𝐴 
Factor markets clear as demand equals supply:  
𝐾𝐾𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 + 𝐾𝐾𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝐾𝐾𝐷𝐷
𝑓𝑓 + 𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸
𝑓𝑓 = 𝐾𝐾
𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 + 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷
𝑓𝑓 + 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸
𝑓𝑓 = 𝐿𝐿
Wages and rental rates are equal for all goods and across the formal and informal 
sectors:  
𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞 = 𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 ,∀𝑠𝑠 ∈ {𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿},∀𝑞𝑞 ∈ {𝑖𝑖,𝑓𝑓}∀𝑟𝑟 ∈ {𝑈𝑈,𝐺𝐺,𝐸𝐸}
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Taxes are zero for informal good and factors, domestically produced investment 
inputs, and investment. Formal factors face the same tax rates whether producing exports 
or formal goods:  
𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾 ≡ 𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 ,𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿 ≡ 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 ,∀𝑟𝑟 ∈ {𝐺𝐺,𝐸𝐸}
The numeraire is foreign exchange: 
𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊 = 1 
And goods markets clear: 
𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈 = 𝑈𝑈 
𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷 = 𝐺𝐺 
𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀 = 𝑀𝑀 = 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶 + 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼 
𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈 + 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 + 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 = 𝐼𝐼 
𝑁𝑁 = 𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈 + 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 
The transfer to the consumer is equal to the tax revenue: 





The parameters in the model are production and utility function parameters, time 
inital calibrated amounts, capital and foreign exchange, and tax rates. 
All inputs are combined using CES production functions in the following form: 








Where 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 is the quantity of factor 𝑗𝑗, Θ𝑗𝑗 is the share of factor 𝑗𝑗, and 𝐴𝐴 is the share 
parameter. The elasticity of substation is adjusted so that 𝜎𝜎 = 1
1−𝜌𝜌
. The CES function can 
be rewritten in calibrated form as: 












where benchmark levels are denoted with bars and 𝐺𝐺 denotes prices. Thus the share 




The structure of these CES and CET production functions are illustrated in the diagram 
below, taken from the Auriol and Warlters paper.  
Figure 2.1: Model Function Structure 
This diagram illustrates the relationships between the inputs into the model and the 
outputs. All sigmas (σ) denote elasticity of substitution while taus (τ) denote elasticities 
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of transformation. Thus 𝜎𝜎𝐶𝐶 is the elasticity of substitution between untaxed, domestic, 
and imports consumed by the representative consumer. 𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷 is the elasticity of 
transformation between production of the domestic good or production of investment 
input.  
Model Specifications 
Due to the lack of reliable elasticity estimates in all countries, elasticities are set 
to unity in the base case. To test for robustness of the results, 23 specifications of the 
model are run with differing elasticities. Each specification is shown in the table below. 
Any elasticities (including 𝜏𝜏’s) not listed in the table remained at unity. Table 3.1 
explains each elasticity.  
Table 3.1: Elasticities Defined 
𝜎𝜎𝑉𝑉 Elasticity of substitution between leisure (Z) and .consumption (C) 
𝜎𝜎𝐶𝐶  Elasticity of substitution between consumption of untaxed, domestic, and imported goods 
𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 Elasticity of substitution between imported investment and domestic investment 
𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼 Elasticity of substitution between use of investment or factors in the production of domestic goods 
𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷 Elasticity of substitution between the use of capital and labor in the production of domestic goods 
𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝐾𝐾 Elasticity of substitution between formal and informal capital in the production of domestic goods 
𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 Elasticity of substitution between formal and informal labor in the production of domestic goods 
𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼 Elasticity of substitution between use of investment or factors in the production of export goods 
𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 Elasticity of substitution between the use of capital and labor in the production of exports 
𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝐾𝐾 Elasticity of substitution between formal and informal capital in the production of export goods 
𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 Elasticity of substitution between formal and informal labor in the production of export goods 
𝜎𝜎𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼 Elasticity of substitution between the use of investment or factors of production of export goods 
𝜎𝜎𝑈𝑈 Elasticity of substitution between the use of capital and labor in the production of untaxed goods 
𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷 Elasticity of transformation between the production of domestic goods and domestic investment inputs 
𝜏𝜏𝑈𝑈 Elasticity of transformation between the production of untaxed goods and untaxed investment inputs 
The results of these specifications will be discussed in the robustness section. 
Table 3.2 shows each specification of the model.  
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Table 3.2: Specification  Elasticities 
Specification 1* 𝜎𝜎𝐶𝐶 = 1,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷 = 1,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘 = 1,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 = 1,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 = 1,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 = 1,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙 = 1,𝜎𝜎𝑈𝑈 = 1,𝜎𝜎𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 = 1; 𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟 𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 = 0 
Specification 2 𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝑈𝑈 = 0.5 
Specification 3 𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙 = 0.5 
Specification 4 𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝑈𝑈 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙 = 0.5 
Specification 5 𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙 = 0.5 
Specification 6 𝜎𝜎𝐶𝐶 = 0.5 
Specification 7 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 = 0.5 
Specification 8 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐶𝐶 = 0.5 
Specification 9 𝜎𝜎𝐶𝐶 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝑈𝑈 = 0.5 
Specification 10 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐶𝐶 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝑈𝑈 = 0.5 
Specification 11 𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝑈𝑈 = 2 
Specification 12 𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙 = 2 
Specification 13 𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝑈𝑈 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙 = 2 
Specification 14 𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙 = 2 
Specification 15 𝜎𝜎𝐶𝐶 = 2 
Specification 16 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 = 2 
Specification 17 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝐶𝐶 = 2 
Specification 18 𝜎𝜎𝐶𝐶 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝑈𝑈 = 2 
Specification 19 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝐶𝐶 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝑈𝑈 = 2 
Specification 20 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 = 1.3574,𝜎𝜎𝐶𝐶 = 1.3674,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷 = 1,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 = 1,𝜎𝜎𝑈𝑈 = 1,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘 = 1,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 = 1,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 = 1,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙 = 1 
Specification 21 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 = 1.3745,𝜎𝜎𝐶𝐶 = 1.3745,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝑈𝑈 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 = 0.5,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙 = 0.5 
Specification 22 Labor elasticity = 0.05 
Specification 23 Labor elasticity = 1 
* Specification 1 is the base case.
Model Limitations 
A generalized model such as this has several limitations. The issues associated 
with the calibration of the informal sector is certainly one of these limitations and has 
already been addressed. Due to the calibration process, the model is unable to handle zero 
tax rates when they are used specifically for calibration.  For instance, the domestic sector 
is calibrated by dividing domestic tax revenue as a percent of GDP by the domestic tax 
rate. If there is no VAT or GST in the country, the calibrated value of the domestic sector 
would be 0.00 and would return an error in GAMS MPSG. To overcome this deficiency, 
zero values were replaced with 0.01 percent – the lowest possible value which the model 
could still function. The model is also unable to handle social security contributions 




RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
MCF Calculations 
There are a couple of important rules for interpreting these MCF calculations. If 
the MCF estimate is less than zero, a marginal increase in the tax reduces overall tax 
revenue (𝜕𝜕𝛥𝛥/𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 < 0). Auriol and Warlters suggest that these instruments be grouped 
with high MCF estimates, as negative values are ineffective in raising tax revenue. If the 
MCF calculation is positive but less than one (0 < 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 < 1) then a marginal increase in 
the tax rate raises revenue by a greater amount than it reduces welfare. The average 
results of these calculations for all countries are shown in table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Summary Results 
Year D M E L K All GDPpc 
Average 1.02 1.07 1.12 1.09 1.32 1.15 7401 
Average (positive values) 1.02 1.07 1.21 1.37 1.42 1.154 7401 
Maximum 1.34 1.57 4.13 2.39 2.57 1.63 59693 
Minimum  0.00 0.99 -3.66 -19.53 -7.13 0.99 158 
Std. Dev.  0.40 0.09 0.75 2.11 0.90 0.11 11106 
The average MCF across all instruments is 1.15. Among the individual instruments, the 
MCF(E), MCF(L), and MCF(K) calculations are lower due to outlying negative values. 
Overall there are eight negative MCF calculations among six countries. Botswana has a 
-0.08 MCF(L) calculation. Greece and Lao PDR have two negative MCF calculations for
4 The negative-excusive average MCF across all instruments is calculated by averaging 
MCF(All) for countries with only positive values. Thus Botswana, Greece, Lao, Nepal, 
Uruguay, and Zimbabwe were excluded from this average. The average MCF(All) did 
not change as a result of this manipulation.  
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both labor (-19.52 and -0.42) and capital (-7.13 and -1.08). Nepal and Zimbabwe have 
negative calculation for exports at -3.66 and -2.77, respectively. Uruguay’s MCF(L) is 
calculated as -3.87. When these negative values are omitted, the average MCF across all 
instruments remains 1.15. Domestic taxation has the lowest average MCF at 1.02, 
followed by import (1.07) and export (1.21) taxation. Labor and capital taxation are the 
most distorting instruments at 1.37 and 1.42, respectively. MCF calculations for imports 
have a low standard deviation at 0.09, indicating consistently low estimates. Domestic 
taxation has a standard deviation of 0.40 indicating higher variation in MCF(D) 
estimates. The remaining instruments have even higher standard deviations indicating 
significant variation in MCF calculations with labor’s standard deviation reaching 2.11. 
This is partially due to Greece’s outlying MCF(L) estimate of -19.53. When this is 
excluded, variation is less than that of exports as the standard deviation is 0.63.  These 
results suggest domestic taxation is, on average, the least distorting instrument. Welfare 
could be increased through the general increase in domestic taxation and subsequent 
decrease in factor taxation. The failure of global governments to equalize the MCF across 
instruments given the relatively high MCF for labor and capital suggests redistributive 
concerns trump efficiency in policy decisions. 
Due to the significant variation in MCF calculations, the data is disaggregated 
into the following seven categories for further analysis: Developed, Emerging Europe, 
Developing Asia, Latin America, Islands, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and 
Sub-Saharan Africa. This will allow for comparison of similar-mannered countries. The 
calculations for developed countries are shown in Table 4.2.  
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Table 4.2: Developed MCF Calculations 
Country Year MCF(D) MCF(M) MCF(E) MCF(L) MCF(K) MCF(ALL) 
Croatia 2013 1.26 1.02 1.02 1.62 1.31 1.13 
Czech Republic 2014 1.21 1.00 1.00 1.22 1.22 1.09 
Germany 2014 1.22 1.02 1.03 1.54 1.44 1.14 
Greece 2012 0.01 0.99 0.99 -19.53 -7.13 0.99 
Iceland 2014 1.33 1.06 1.08 1.64 1.35 1.23 
Israel 2014 1.23 1.05 1.13 1.73 1.51 1.23 
Japan 2012 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.98 1.38 1.00 
Korea 2014 1.14 1.04 1.05 1.27 1.30 1.13 
Lithuania 2014 1.20 0.99 0.99 1.17 1.23 1.08 
Poland 2013 1.24 1.01 1.01 1.45 1.33 1.15 
Portugal 2014 1.32 1.07 1.12 1.70 1.45 1.26 
Slovak Republic 2014 1.20 1.00 1.00 1.21 1.28 1.09 
Switzerland 2012 1.09 1.01 1.01 1.45 1.21 1.06 
United Kingdom 2014 1.34 1.11 1.43 1.70 1.49 1.32 
Average 1.06 1.03 1.06 0.01 0.74 1.14 
Average (positive values) 1.06 1.03 1.06 1.51 1.35 1.15 
Maximum  1.34 1.11 1.43 1.98 1.51 1.32 
Minimum 0.00 0.99 0.99 -19.53 -7.13 0.99 
Std. Dev.  0.43 0.03 0.11 5.43 2.18 0.09 
Among developed nations, the MCF across all instruments varies between 1.32 
(United Kingdom) and 0.99 (Greece). With all MCF calculations below unity and two 
negative values, it appears that Greece’s data poorly interacted with the calibration 
process. Excluding Greece, the average MCF across all instruments is 1.15 with import, 
export, and domestic taxation having the lowest MCF. Domestic taxation appears to be 
less distorting as a result of Japan’s 0.00 MCF(D). When Japan is not considered, the 
MCF(D) rises to 1.14. For 12 of the 14 developed countries in the sample, the MCF for 
trade taxes is lower than for that of domestic or factor taxes. Welfare among developed 
countries could be enhanced through reducing domestic taxation and factor taxation 
while increasing trade taxes. This would suggest that the general transition to domestic 
33 
taxation in an attempt at base-broadening has resulted in lower than optimal welfare. The 
large magnitude of factor taxes indicates the redistributive aims of taxation are being 
prioritized over tax structure efficiency.   
Table 4.3: Emerging Europe MCF Calculations 
Country Year MCF(D) MCF(M) MCF(E) MCF(L) MCF(K) MCF(ALL) 
Albania 2014 1.23 1.04 1.09 1.41 1.32 1.15 
Armenia 2014 1.23 1.05 1.24 1.56 1.47 1.20 
Belarus 2013 1.16 1.03 1.03 1.28 1.29 1.07 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2014 1.17 1.00 1.01 1.14 1.17 1.09 
Georgia 2014 1.18 1.01 1.02 1.25 1.30 1.14 
Kyrgyz Republic 2014 1.08 1.00 1.01 1.13 1.13 1.04 
Macedonia, F.Y.R. of 2012 0.01 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.10 1.00 
Moldova 2014 1.17 0.99 0.98 1.34 1.24 1.10 
Russia 2014 1.13 1.28 1.27 1.48 1.50 1.20 
Serbia, Republic of 2012 1.16 1.02 1.05 1.25 1.36 1.13 
Ukraine 2014 1.19 1.01 1.01 1.27 1.28 1.10 
Uzbekistan* 2014 1.23 1.06 1.11 1.35 1.23 1.18 
Average 1.08 1.04 1.07 1.30 1.28 1.12 
Average (positive values) 1.08 1.04 1.07 1.30 1.28 1.12 
Maximum  1.23 1.28 1.27 1.56 1.50 1.20 
Minimum 0.01 0.99 0.98 1.10 1.10 1.00 
Std. Dev.  0.32 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.06 
*As a former Soviet Republic Uzbekistan was included in the Emerging Europe group. 
Emerging Europe MCF calculations yielded no negative values. The MCF across 
all instruments was 1.12 with trade taxes possessing the lowest MCF followed by 
domestic. Factor taxes had the highest MCF with a MCF(L) of 1.30 and MCF(K) of 1.28. 
There are relatively low standard deviations among these results suggesting consistent 
estimates. It appears Macedonia is an outlier, with a MCF(D) calculation of 0.01. When 
this value is excluded, the average MCF(D) rises to 1.18 – significantly larger than the 
trade taxes, but still lower than the factor taxes. This suggests that for most countries in 
34 
this group welfare could be increased in revenue-neutral tax reform through the increase 
in trade taxes and subsequent decreased in factor and domestic taxation. Like Developed 
countries, the failure of Emerging European countries to equate MCF across instruments 
implies redistribution aims trump efficiency in tax policy.  
Table 4.4: Latin America MCF Calculations 
Country Year MCF(D) MCF(M) MCF(E) MCF(L) MCF(K) MCF(ALL) 
Belize 2012 0.55 1.00 1.00 1.25 1.25 1.00 
Bolivia 2012 0.01 1.00 1.00 0.59 1.25 1.00 
Colombia 2014 1.23 1.09 1.35 1.70 1.47 1.24 
El Salvador 2013 1.14 1.03 1.10 1.46 1.47 1.13 
Guatemala 2013 1.14 1.03 1.07 1.08 1.42 1.13 
Honduras 2014 1.16 1.02 1.04 1.29 1.40 1.12 
Nicaragua 2014 1.12 0.99 0.98 0.82 1.39 1.05 
Paraguay 2014 1.08 1.01 1.01 1.20 1.14 1.07 
Peru 2014 1.27 1.08 1.28 1.58 1.58 1.27 
Uruguay 2012 1.21 1.03 1.08 -3.87 1.45 1.20 
Average 0.99 1.03 1.09 0.71 1.38 1.12 
Average (positive values) 0.99 1.03 1.09 1.22 1.38 1.12 
Maximum  1.27 1.09 1.35 1.70 1.58 1.27 
Minimum 0.01 0.99 0.98 -3.87 1.14 1.00 
Std. Dev.  0.38 0.03 0.12 1.56 0.12 0.09 
Table 4.4 shows the model results for Latin American countries. While it initially 
appears the average MCF(D) is lower than the trade taxes, this is largely influenced by 
Bolivia and Belize, two outliers which lower the average. Across each of the remaining 
countries, trade taxes have the lowest MCF calculations, followed by MCF(D) and then 
the factor taxes. The MCF(D) for Bolivia is 0.01, an outlier, and when this is excluded 
the average MCF(D) for Latin America rises to 1.10. This is consistent with the findings 
in the Developed and Emerging Europe countries. Welfare can be increased in a revenue-
neutral way through the increase in trade taxes and decrease in factor taxes.   
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Table 4.5: Developing Asia MCF Calculations 
Country Year MCF(D) MCF(M) MCF(E) MCF(L) MCF(K) MCF(ALL) 
Bangladesh 2013 1.20 1.14 1.30 1.52 1.57 1.22 
Cambodia 2014 1.09 1.03 1.04 1.28 1.27 1.07 
China 2013 1.22 1.05 1.07 1.37 1.41 1.19 
Indonesia 2012 0.01 1.00 1.00 0.57 0.52 1.00 
Kazakhstan 2014 1.19 1.19 1.16 0.77 1.31 1.22 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 2014 1.07 1.02 1.02 -0.42 -1.08 1.04 
Malaysia 2014 1.23 1.11 1.11 1.28 1.25 1.14 
Nepal 2014 1.16 1.11 -3.66 1.40 1.51 1.23 
New Zealand 2012 0.01 1.00 1.00 1.57 1.28 1.00 
Philippines 2014 1.25 1.22 1.45 1.62 1.61 1.31 
Sri Lanka 2014 1.12 1.07 1.13 1.25 1.41 1.12 
Average 1.02 1.08 0.50 0.97 0.97 1.14 
Average (positive values) 1.02 1.08 1.10 1.17 1.26 1.14 
Maximum  1.23 1.19 1.30 1.52 1.57 1.23 
Minimum 0.01 1.00 -3.66 -0.42 -1.08 1.00 
Std. Dev.  0.38 0.06 1.58 0.61 0.83 0.08 
Developing Asia has two outliers, New Zealand and Indonesia, which both have 
calculated MCF(D) of 0.01. When New Zealand and Indonesia, are excluded, the average 
MCF(D) rises to 1.17, equivalent to that of the negative-exclusive MCF(L). The 
similarity of MCF(D) to MCF(L) suggests Developing Asia countries have higher 
domestic tax inefficiencies. There are three negative values in this group, indicating that 
an increase in the tax rate would result in a decrease in revenue. The MCF for capital 
taxation remains the most inefficient instrument while trade taxes have the lowest MCF.  
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Table 4.6: Island MCF Calculations 
Country Year MCF(D) MCF(M) MCF(E) MCF(L) MCF(K) MCF(ALL) 
Antigua and Barbuda 2014 1.15 1.06 1.09 1.34 1.36 1.10 
Bahamas 2014 0.01 1.11 1.15 1.15 1.18 1.13 
Cabo Verde 2012 1.13 1.06 1.31 1.36 1.49 1.14 
Costa Rica 2014 1.15 1.04 1.06 1.21 1.43 1.12 
Dominica 2014 1.14 1.04 1.10 1.34 1.12 1.12 
Dominican Republic 2013 1.21 1.05 1.09 1.38 1.47 1.17 
Fiji 2013 1.12 1.04 1.07 1.29 1.32 1.10 
Grenada 2014 1.15 1.06 1.18 1.48 1.55 1.14 
Jamaica 2014 1.27 1.26 2.65 1.62 1.92 1.37 
Maldives 2014 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.10 1.27 1.09 
Mauritius 2014 1.16 1.01 1.01 1.21 1.23 1.10 
Palau 2014 0.02 1.06 1.09 1.15 1.14 1.09 
Samoa 2014 1.14 1.05 1.23 1.39 1.48 1.14 
Solomon Islands 2014 1.20 1.57 2.01 2.10 1.96 1.63 
St. Kitts and Nevis 2014 1.17 1.05 1.08 1.16 1.61 1.13 
St. Lucia 2014 1.11 1.03 1.04 1.20 1.48 1.11 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2014 1.17 1.06 1.34 1.53 1.66 1.15 
Trinidad and Tobago 2012 0.01 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.25 1.00 
Average 0.97 1.09 1.25 1.33 1.44 1.16 
Average (positive values) 0.97 1.09 1.25 1.33 1.44 1.16 
Maximum  1.27 1.57 2.65 2.10 1.96 1.63 
Minimum 0.01 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.12 1.00 
Std. Dev.  0.43 0.13 0.40 0.24 0.23 0.13 
Similarly to the Developing Asia group, Island MCF(D) calculations are lowered 
by outliers (Palau with a MCF(D) of 0.02 and Trinidad and Tobago with a MCF(D) of 
0.01). When these outliers are excluded, the average MCF(D) increases to 1.16. The 
MCF across all instruments is also 1.16. On average, welfare could be increased among 
these countries through a reduction in trade taxes and a decrease in factor taxes. There are 
a few countries in this group for which this generalization does not hold. Jamaica has 
relatively high MCF calculations, with MCF(E) reaching 2.65. This is significantly 
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higher than the calculation for the MCF(L), 1.62 and the MCF(K), 1.92. The Solomon 
Islands also has a relatively high export MCF at 2.01 along with high MCF(L) and 
MCF(K) at 2.10 and 1.96, respectively. A reduction in the export tax rate among these 
countries, in addition to the labor and capital tax rates, would enhance welfare.  
Table 4.7: MENA MCF Calculations 
Country Year MCF(D) MCF(M) MCF(E) MCF(L) MCF(K) MCF(ALL) 
Bahrain, Kingdom of 2013 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.02 
Iraq 2014 0.99 1.02 1.01 1.04 1.13 1.03 
Jordan 2014 1.13 0.99 0.99 1.25 1.23 1.08 
Kuwait 2013 0.99 1.02 1.01 1.00 0.92 1.02 
Lebanon 2014 1.08 1.00 1.00 1.45 1.02 1.03 
Morocco 2014 1.27 1.07 1.20 1.66 1.59 1.23 
Pakistan 2014 1.21 1.03 1.17 1.49 1.64 1.19 
Syria 2012 0.00 1.08 1.15 0.67 1.40 1.12 
Tunisia 2012 1.23 1.07 1.13 1.47 1.47 1.18 
Turkey 2014 1.25 1.07 1.15 1.54 1.41 1.22 
Average 1.02 1.04 1.08 1.26 1.28 1.11 
Average (positive values) 1.02 1.04 1.08 1.26 1.28 1.11 
Maximum  1.27 1.08 1.20 1.66 1.64 1.23 
Minimum 0.00 0.99 0.99 0.67 0.92 1.02 
Std. Dev.  0.35 0.03 0.08 0.30 0.24 0.08 
MENA countries display a similar pattern to the previous groups, with the 
average MCF(D) brought down by an outlier (Syria). When this value is omitted, the 
average MCF(D) rises from1.02 to 1.13. The average result is large MCF for factors, low 
MCF for trade taxes, and the MCF for domestic taxation in between. For six out of the 
ten countries in the MENA sample, welfare could be enhanced through revenue neutral 
tax reform that lowers domestic taxation and raises trade taxes. For each of these 
countries, welfare could be enhanced by a greater degree by lowering factor taxes and 
raising trade taxes.  
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Table 4.8: Sub-Saharan Africa MCF Calculations 
Country Year MCF(D) MCF(M) MCF(E) MCF(L) MCF(K) MCF(ALL) 
Angola 2014 1.29 1.20 1.28 1.26 1.47 1.28 
Benin 2013 1.15 1.10 1.24 1.21 1.67 1.17 
Botswana 2014 1.10 1.32 1.35 -0.08 1.44 1.24 
Burkina Faso 2014 1.12 1.01 1.02 1.26 1.38 1.07 
Burundi 2013 1.26 1.10 0.03 1.85 1.63 1.30 
Central African Republic 2012 1.23 1.12 1.36 2.06 1.75 1.22 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 2012 0.01 1.19 1.19 1.40 1.57 1.22 
Congo, Republic of 2012 1.17 1.03 1.02 1.28 1.28 1.08 
Côte d'Ivoire 2014 1.21 1.23 1.24 1.49 1.49 1.26 
Equatorial Guinea 2012 1.25 1.07 1.05 1.08 1.31 1.09 
Ethiopia 2012 1.22 1.26 2.43 2.10 2.57 1.46 
Gambia, The 2012 0.01 1.00 1.00 1.48 1.32 1.00 
Ghana 2012 1.16 1.09 1.19 1.42 1.49 1.16 
Kenya 2013 1.34 1.18 4.13 1.65 1.80 1.35 
Lesotho 2013 1.16 1.05 1.32 1.45 1.50 1.15 
Liberia 2013 1.09 1.10 1.30 1.22 1.62 1.16 
Madagascar 2012 0.01 1.00 1.00 1.27 1.20 1.00 
Malawi 2014 1.22 1.07 1.13 1.40 1.48 1.18 
Mali 2013 1.14 1.01 1.03 0.98 1.50 1.08 
Mozambique 2013 1.25 1.08 2.05 1.69 1.69 1.22 
Namibia 2012 1.19 1.31 2.16 1.57 2.01 1.33 
Nigeria 2013 1.15 1.00 1.00 1.31 1.31 1.01 
Uganda 2014 1.22 1.07 1.20 1.69 1.61 1.18 
Rwanda 2012 1.26 1.11 2.91 1.39 1.84 1.24 
Senegal 2012 0.02 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.30 1.00 
Sierra Leone 2014 1.18 1.06 1.08 1.36 1.39 1.13 
South Africa 2014 1.28 1.15 1.82 1.56 1.55 1.30 
Suriname 2012 1.14 1.12 1.10 1.24 1.49 1.16 
Tanzania 2013 1.30 1.13 1.51 1.59 1.72 1.30 
Togo 2013 1.16 1.05 1.10 1.52 1.45 1.12 
Zimbabwe 2012 1.19 1.39 -2.77 2.39 2.32 1.56 
Average 1.05 1.12 1.27 1.42 1.59 1.19 
Average (positive values) 1.05 1.12 1.41 1.47 1.59 1.19 
Maximum  1.34 1.39 4.13 2.39 2.57 1.56 
Minimum 0.01 1.00 -2.77 -0.08 1.20 1.00 
Std. Dev.  0.40 0.10 1.02 0.42 0.29 0.13 
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Table 4.8 shows the MCF calculations for Sub-Saharan Africa. The initial 
averages in the table suggest lower MCF(D) then in actuality. When the MCF(D) 
calculations for Senegal (0.02), Madagascar (0.01), The Gambia (0.01), and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (0.01) are omitted, the average MCF(D) rises to 1.16. 
There are two other outliers: Botswana has a MCF(L) of -0.08 and Zimbabwe has a 
MCF(E) of -2.77. When no outliers are considered the lowest MCF is for import taxation, 
followed by domestic taxation and then export taxation. Exports (1.41) is significantly 
larger than domestic or imports. Factor taxes remain the greatest MCF with the MCF(K) 
at 1.59 and the MCF(L) at 1.47. This suggests that import and domestic taxes should be 
increased and factor taxes reduced in order to increase welfare.  
The average results for each group is shown in the Table 4.9. These notes are the 
average of positive values, omitting outliers as explained for each country group.  
Table 4.9: Average MCF Calculations by Country Group 
Group D M E L K All 
Developed 1.14 1.03 1.06 1.51 1.35 1.15 
Emerging Europe 1.18 1.04 1.07 1.30 1.28 1.12 
Latin America 1.10 1.03 1.09 1.22 1.38 1.12 
Developing Asia 1.17 1.08 1.10 1.17 1.26 1.14 
Island 1.16 1.09 1.24 1.33 1.44 1.16 
MENA 1.13 1.04 1.08 1.26 1.28 1.11 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.16 1.12 1.41 1.47 1.59 1.19 
These results show that MCF(D) are generally higher than the MCF of trade taxes, 
confirming the hypothesis that welfare could be increased through revenue-neutral tax 
reform that increases trade taxes and decreases domestic taxes. However, this is largely 
overshadowed by the even higher MCF for factor taxation. Welfare could be increased 
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even more by revenue neutral tax reform that increases trade taxes and reduces factor 
taxes in lieu of domestic tax reductions.  
Robustness Testing 
As explained in the “Model Specification” section, the model was run using 
several specifications with different elasticities. This allows for evaluation of MCF 
calculation robustness without having explicit elasticity data on each sector for each 
country. As an ordinal measure, it is most important that the MCF calculations remain 
ordered given differing elasticity inputs. Differing elasticities will likely change the 
magnitude of the resulting MCF calculations, however if the ordering remains consistent 
the results are robust.  
Auriol and Warlters use three measures of robustness to evaluate country reuslts. 
The first measure of robustness examines if the largest and smallest MCF estimates are 
consistent through each specification of the model. This means that the instruments with 
the most extreme MCF estimates remain the same through each adjustment in elasticity. 
The second measure of robustness examines if the ordering of the ten possible 
combinations are consistent through each specification of the model. This means each 
specification has the same ordering as the base case. The third measure of robustness 
holds if one pairwise combination differs from the base case. If the results for a country 
do not prove to be robust it suggests that the MCF for the instrument or instruments in 
question are highly dependent on the elasticity of factor substitution. An example 
robustness check for Colombia is shown in Table 5.1.  
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Table 5.1: Colombia Robustness Test 
Specification D M E L K 
1 4 5 3 1 2 
2 4 5 3 1 2 
3 4 5 3 1 2 
4 4 5 3 1 2 
5 4 5 3 1 2 
6 4 5 3 1 2 
7 4 5 3 1 2 
8 4 5 3 1 2 
9 4 5 3 1 2 
10 4 5 3 1 2 
11 4 5 3 1 2 
12 4 5 3 1 2 
13 4 5 3 1 2 
14 4 5 3 1 2 
15 4 5 3 1 2 
16 4 5 3 1 2 
17 4 5 3 1 2 
18 4 5 3 1 2 
19 4 5 2 1 3 
20 4 5 3 1 2 
21 4 5 3 1 2 
22 4 5 3 1 2 
23 4 5 3 1 2 
For all but the nineteenth model specification, Colombia retains the ordering of its MCF 
estimates. In the nineteenth specification, elasticities are set such that: 
𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝐶𝐶 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 = 2,𝜎𝜎𝑈𝑈 = 2. 
The increase in the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital allows the export 
producer to more easily use that input factor with a larger share in the informal economy. 
As a result, the MCF(E) increases to 2.10, surpassing the MCF(K) calculation. This fits 
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Auriol and Warlters third measure of robustness, as only one pairwise combination 
mismatches.  
To consider the robustness of each country’s MCF calculations, this paper counts 
the number of times the ordering differed from the initial specification. The number of 
differences from the base case can be found in Appendix B. While for some countries 
there are significant differences between model specifications, many of these differences 
are attributable to ordering changes in either trade taxes or factors taxes. Across all 
countries and all model specifications, the average order for MCF(K) is 1.65 while the 
average order for MCF(L) is 2.03, indicating placement as the instruments with the 
highest MCF. The robustness tests leave the conclusion that factor taxes generally have 
the highest MCF and trade taxes generally have the lowest MCF unaffected.  
Regressions and Broader Results 
To examine country-specific factors relationship with the MCF we can plot the 
MCF(All) calculations against several variables including log GDP per capita, the 
calibrated informal sector, and informal sector estimates taken from Schneider, Buehn, 
and Montenegro (2010). For each of these plots, MCF(All) values less than and equal to 
unity are omitted from the plot for clarity. Even with these omissions significant noise in 
the figures remains. Figure 3.1 shows the relationship between MCF(All) and log GDP 
per capita.  
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Figure 3.1 
The plot shows a negative relationship between MCF(All) and log GDP per capita. There 
is significant variation in the relationship. To test the statistical significance three 
different linear regression models were used. The first model regressed the log of GDP 
per capita on each MCF calculation. The second model disaggregated log GDP per capita 
into log GDP and log population, to isolate the effects of both of these variables. The 
third model added dummy variables for landlocked countries and islands to the 
regression. These models were run with all observations, omitting no MCF calculations. 
We expect the signs on coefficients for log GDP per capita and log GDP to be negative, 
while the coefficient for population should be positive. The results of these regressions 
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Table 6.1: Regression Output, GDP Baseline Adjusted 
 Dep. Var. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
ln(GDPpercap) ln(GDP) ln(Pop) ln(GDP) ln(Pop) Landlocked Island 
MCF(All) -0.0150832* -0.0124024 0 .0193117** -0.0131942 0.0234622** 0.0086183 0.0332633 
(-1.95) (-1.55) (2.29) (-1.54) (2.40) (0.30) (1.05) 
MCF(D) -0.0147958 -0.0094877 0 .0231698 .0018734 -.0048583 .0273273 -0.1670223
(-0.53) (-0.32) (0.75) (0.06) (-0.14) (0.26) (-1.44)
MCF(M) -0.011171* -0.0107544 0 .011829* -0.0121636* 0.0174435** 0.0068503 0.0417576
(-1.76) (-1.63) (1.70) (-1.73) (2.17) (0.29) (1.60) 
MCF(E)  0.0248779 0 .0270511 -0.0213876 -0.0146155 0.0227055 -0.3813409** 0.0348779 
(0.48) (0.49) ( -0.37) (-0.25) (0.35) (-2.00) (0.16) 
MCF(L) -0.2193808 -0.2319727 0.199562 -0.2552038 0.3051266* 0.1752133 0 .8163959 
(-1.51) (-1.53) (1.25) (-1.58) (1.66) (0.33) (1.36) 
MCF(K) -0.1205011* -0.1277415** 0.1091014 -0.1426964** 0.1542712 0.0036618 0.3012991 
(-1.97) (-2.00) (1.62) (-2.09) (1.98) (0.02) (1.19) 
𝑡𝑡 statistics in parenthesis  
* 𝐺𝐺 < 0.10, ** 𝐺𝐺 < 0.05, ***𝐺𝐺 < 0.01, ****𝐺𝐺 < 0.001
The first model shows a negative relationship between log GDP per capita and 
each measure of MCF other than exports. The coefficients for MCF(All), MCF(M), and 
MCF(K) are negative and significant to a 90 percent confidence level. The second model 
shows a negative relationship between log GDP and the MCF for all instruments but 
exports. Only the coefficient for log GDP on MCF(K) is significant at a 95 percent 
confidence level. Log population has a positive relationship with all measures but 
MCF(E). The coefficient of log population on MCF(All) is significant to a 95 confidence 
level, suggesting a significant positive relationship between the population of a country 
and the MCF across all instruments. The coefficient for log population on MCF(M) is 
positive and significant to a 90 percent confidence level, implying a positive relationship 
between country size and the inefficiency of import taxation. The third model includes 
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dummy variables for landlocked and island nations.  When these dummy variables are 
included, the coefficients for log GDP on MCF estimates are negative, with the 
coefficient on MCF(M) and MCF(K) significant to a 90 and 95 percent confidence level, 
respectively. Coefficients for log population are positive and significant for MCF(All) to 
a 95 percent confidence level and MCF(M) to a 90 percent confidence level. Landlocked 
countries have a statistically significant lower MCF(E) than non-landlocked countries. 
The island dummy variable yields no statistically significant results. These regressions 
support a negative relationship between the MCF and GDP, and a positive relationship 
between the MCF and population.  
We can also examine the impact of informal economy size on the MCF. These 
regressions are run with different measures of the informal economy. The relationship is 
first tested using the calibrated measure of the informal sector as a percentage of GDP 
(XU). To account for the inflationary effects in these estimates due to the GDP baseline 
adjustment, the relationship is also testing using estimates of the informal economy from 
Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010). These outside measures of the informal 
economy include estimates for 90 of the 106 countries in the sample. The following 
diagram illustrates the relationship between the MCF(All) and the calibrated value of the 
informal sector. Unitary MCF values were dropped for clarity.  
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Figure 3.2 
The plot shows a positive relationship between the MCF(All) and the calibrated informal 
sector. To test the significance of this relationship two linear regression models are run. 
The first regresses the calibrated informal sector on MCF(All). The second regresses the 
calibrated informal sector, log GDP, and log population on MCF(All). These two models 
are then repeated with all MCF(All) values less than or equal to unity omitted.  
Table 6.2: Calibrated Informal Sector and MCF(All), GDP Baseline Adjusted 
Dep. Var.  Model 1 Model 2 
Xu Xu ln(GDP) ln(Pop) 
MCF(All) 0.0002039 -0.00014 -0.0128169 0.0202812** 
(0.50) (-0.32) (-1.57) (2.26) 
Omitting values ≤ 1 0.0014672**** 0 .0012266*** -0.0072488 0.0112316 
(3.49) (2.66) (-0.90) (1.28) 
𝑡𝑡 statistics in parenthesis  
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The first model regressed upon MCF(All) shows a positive relationship between Xu and 
MCF(All) but is not statistically significant. The second model regressed upon MCF(All) 
yields only a positive and statistically significant result for log population. When all 
MCF(All) values less than or equal to unity are omitted from the dependent variable, 
there are positive and statistically significant coefficients for the informal economy for 
both models. In the first model the coefficient of the calibrated informal sector on 
MCF(All) is positive and significant to a 99.9 percent confidence level. In the second 
model the coefficient of the calibrated informal sector on MCF(All) is positive and 
significant to a 99 percent confidence level. The coefficients for both log GDP and log 
population have their expected signs but are not statistically significant. To test this trend 
further we examine the relationship using informal economy estimates from Schneider, 
Buehn, and Montenegro (2010). These estimates of the informal economy are plotted 
against MCF(All). MCF(All) values less than or equal to one are omitted for clarity.  
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Figure 3.3 
Figure 3.3 shows a positive relationship between MCF(All) and estimates of the informal 
economy from Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro. To test the significance of this 
relationship, two linear regression models are tested. The first regresses Schneider et. al. 
informal sector estimates on MCF(All). The second regresses Schneider et. al. informal 
sector estimates, log GDP, and log population on MCF(All). These two models are then 
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Table 6.3: Schneider et. al. Informal Sector and MCF(All), GDP Baseline Adjusted 
Dep. Var.  Model 1 Model 2 
Informal Informal ln(GDP) ln(Pop) 
MCF(All) 0.0015293* 0.0012652 -0.0077585 0.0196925 
(1.87) (1.45) (-0.82) (1.82) 
Omitting values ≤ 1 0.001765** 0.0013821 -0.007818 0.0190424* 
(2.14) (1.56) (-0.82) (1.74) 
𝑡𝑡 statistics in parenthesis  
* 𝐺𝐺 < 0.10, ** 𝐺𝐺 < 0.05, ***𝐺𝐺 < 0.01, ****𝐺𝐺 < 0.001
The first model yields a positive coefficient for informal on MCF(All), which is 
statistically significant to a 90 percent confidence level. The second model yields no 
statistically significant results, though the signs on the coefficients match expectations. 
When all MCF(All) values less than or equal to unity are omitted, the first model yields a 
positive and significant coefficient for informal on MCF(All). This is a strong indicator 
of a relationship between MCF(All) and the size of the informal economy, given that the 
data comes from a secondary source and its calculation is not dependent on the model. 
The second model yields the expected coefficient signs, with only log population having 
a statistically significant coefficient (to a 90 percent confidence level). Although not 
extremely robust, the consistency of the coefficient signs supports the role of the informal 
sector in MCF calculations.  
These country-specific factors can also be examined using the limited sample of 
68 countries, calculated without the baseline GDP adjustment.  These same models and 
regression are run to check the robustness of the results. Figure 3.4 shows the relationship 
between MCF(All) and log GDP per capita for the reduced sample. MCF(All) less than 
or equal to unity are omitted for clarity. 
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Figure 3.4 
This plot shows a negative relationship between MCF(All) and log GDP per capita. This 
relationship appears stronger than that in the 106 country sample. To test statistical 
significance, the same three models are used. The first model regressed the log of GDP 
per capita on each MCF calculation. The second model disaggregated log GDP per capita 
into log GDP and log population, to isolate the effects of both of these variables. The 
third model added dummy variables for landlocked countries and islands to the second 
regression. These models are run with the limited 68 country set not requiring the 
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Table 6.4: Regression Output, Unadjusted 
 Dep. Var. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
ln(GDPpercap) ln(GDP) ln(Pop) ln(GDP) ln(Pop) Landlocked Island 
MCF(All) -0.0159295*** -0.0144881** 0.0186426*** -0.0164567** 0.0230169** 0.0008633 0.0315053 
(-2.810) (-2.47) (2.94) (-2.37) (3.03) (0.04) (1.38) 
MCF(D) -0.0276459 -0.0275307 0.0278644 -0.0159975 0.0008663 -0.0123113 -0.2012499
(-0.77) (-0.74) (0.69) (-0.36) (0.02) (-0.08) (-1.38)
MCF(M) -0.0127734** -0.0134738** 0.0113793* -0.0170162** 0.017955** -0.0052987 0.0409379*
(-2.21) (-2.24) (1.75) (-2.41) (2.33) (-0.21) (1.76) 
MCF(E)  -0.0556136** -0.055899** 0.0545428* -0.0377501 0.0465176 0.1629039 0.1023579 
(-2.20) (-2.13) (1.92) (-1.22) (1.37) (1.50) (1.00) 
MCF(L) 0.0255746 0.0378367 -0.0023713 0.025244 0.0149957 -0.0506209 0.0724577 
(0.88) (1.28) (-0.07) (0.72) (0.39) (-0.41) (0.62) 
MCF(K) -0.0846427** -0.0751909 0.1022059** -0.0766675 0.0969668* -0.0444216 -0.0799801
(-2.03) (-1.74) (2.20) (-1.48) (1.71) (-0.25) (-0.47)
𝑡𝑡 statistics in parenthesis  
* 𝐺𝐺 < 0.10, ** 𝐺𝐺 < 0.05, ***𝐺𝐺 < 0.01, ****𝐺𝐺 < 0.001
The first model produces negative coefficients on all MCF measurements other than 
exports. The coefficient for log GDP per capita on MCF(All) is negative and statically 
significant to a 99 percent confidence level. The coefficient on MCF(M) and MCF(K) are 
also negative and significant to a 95 percent confidence level. This suggests a general 
negative relationship between country wealth and the MCF. The second model produces 
coefficient signs consistent with the first model and several that are statistically 
significant. The coefficient for log GDP on MCF(All), MCF(M), and MCF(E) are 
statistically significant to a 95 percent confidence level. The coefficient for log 
population on MCF(All) is statistically significant at a 99 percent confidence level while 
the MCF(K) is significant at a 95 percent confidence level. Both the coefficients on 
MCF(M) and MCF(E) are significant at a 90 percent confidence level. This supports the 
finding that GDP has a negative relationship with the MCF. The third model incorporates 
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dummy variables for landlocked and island nations. The confident for the island dummy 
variable on MCF(M) is statistically significant at a 90 percent confidence level. This 
implies island national have a higher MCF(M) than non-island countries. No other 
dummy variable coefficients are statistically significant. The coefficient for log GDP and 
log population on MCF(All) retain their signs and remain statistically significant to a 95 
percent confidence level when controlling for landlocked or island status. The 
coefficients for log GDP and log population on MCF(M) are also statistically significant 
to a 95 percent confidence level. The signs imply that greater GDP decreases the 
MCF(M) while greater population increases it. These results confirm what was found 
earlier with the large sample of countries, that country wealth has a negative relationship 
with the marginal cost of funds while country population has a positive relationship.  
Duplicating the regressions with the 68 country sample, we can examine the 
impact of informal economy size on the MCF. Once again these regressions are run with 
both the calibrated measures of the informal economy and outside measures from 
Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010). The following diagram illustrates the 
relationship between the MCF(All) and the calibrated value of the informal sector. 
Unitary MCF values were dropped for clarity.  
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Figure 3.5 
The plot shows a positive relationship between the MCF(All) and the calibrated informal 
sector. To test the significance of this relationship two linear regression models are run. 
The first regresses the calibrated informal sector on MCF(All). The second regresses the 
calibrated informal sector, log GDP, and log population on MCF(All). These two models 
are then repeated with all MCF(All) values less than or equal to unity omitted.  
Table 6.5: Regression Output 
Dep. Var.  Model 1 Model 2 
Xu Xu ln(GDP) ln(Pop) 
MCF(All) 0.0004051 0.0000105 -0.0144597*** 0.0185954*** 
(0.87) (0.02) (-2.39) (2.77) 
Omitting values ≤ 1 0.0020461**** 0.0016921*** -0.0093828 0.010175 
(4.13) (3.10) (-1.48) (1.49) 
𝑡𝑡 statistics in parenthesis  
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The coefficient of the untaxed sector on MCF(All) has a positive sign but is not 
statistically significant. This is also the case in the second model when log GDP and log 
population are included. Both the coefficient for log GDP and log population on 
MCF(All) are significant to a 99 percent confidence level and display the expected signs. 
When the fist model is run again omitting the 11 unitary MCF(All) values, the coefficient 
of XU on MCF(All) is positive and significant to a 99.9 percent confidence level. This 
shows a strong positive relationship between the size of the calibrated untaxed economy 
and MCF(All). When log GDP and log population are added in the second model, the 
coefficient for XU on the MCF(All) remains positive and statistically significant to a 99 
percent confidence level. While retaining their expected signs, the coefficients for log 
GDP and log population are not statistically significant when unitary MCF(All) values 
are omitted. This suggests that there is a strong positive relationship between the MCF 
and the size of the informal economy. This relationship is somewhat hidden by noise in 
MCF calculations. When MCF(All) calculations are equal to one, it is highly likely that 
some of the individual instrument MCF calculations were less than one. This occurs 
largely because of issues with the calibration process. It is therefore reasonable to 
conclude that unitary MCF(All) estimates are the result of model calibration issues and 
should be excluded in analysis. To check the robustness of these results, this relationship 
is tested using untaxed economy estimates from Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro 
(2010). The plot below shows the relationship between these informal economy estimates 
and the 68 country set of MCF(All) calculations.  
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Figure 3.6 
This shows a positive relationship between the MCF(All) and the informal economy 
estimates. To test the statistical significance of this relationship, the same two models are 
run using the estimated informal economy data.    
Table 6.6: Regression Output 
Dep. Var.  Model 1 Model 2 
Informal Informal ln(GDP) ln(Pop) 
MCF(All) 0.0015293* .0002804 -.0131749** .0171364*** 
(1.87) (0.48) (-2.02) (2.41) 
Omitting values ≤ 1 0.0012997** 0.0007271 -0.0132528* 0.0152052** 
(2.35) (1.19) (-1.94) (2.04) 
𝑡𝑡 statistics in parenthesis  
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The coefficient of the informal economy estimates on MCF(All) in the first model has a 
positive sign and is not statically significant to a 90 percent confidence level. In the 
second model, coefficients have the expected signs and the coefficients for log GDP is 
statistically significant to a 95 percent confidence level while the coefficient on log 
population is statically significant to a 99 percent confidence level. When MCF(All) 
values less than unity are omitted, the coefficient for the informal sector is significant 
with to a 95 percent confidence level. When log GDP and log population are added in 
model two, the coefficient on the informal sector is no longer significant. The coefficient 
for log population is significant to a 95 percent confidence level, while the coefficient on 
log GDP is significant to a 90 percent confidence level. Both coefficients have expected 
signs. While the coefficients retain their expected signs, the smaller sample size and the 
use of outside informal economy estimates do not yield strong and statistically significant 
results.  
Costs of Tax Administration 
This section calculates the thresholds at which there would be differences in MCF 
calculation ordering due to administration costs. Tax collection costs differ greatly across 
regions, with Auriol and Warlters (2012) estimates of average expense of tax collection 
ranging from 0.05 percent of tax revenues in the US to 3.6 percent in Uganda. This 
estimate was calculated by dividing the expenses of collection by the total amount of 
collection.  
While these administration costs do effect the MCF, Auriol and Warlters explain 
that they do not affect the equivalent variation in the MCF formula because the 
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administration costs are not lost to society – they are paid out to tax enforcement 
personnel. When evaluating the effect of a tax change, the administration costs only 
impact the revenue portion of the equation as they reduce the amount of revenue the 
government has to spend. This is a point of dispute, however, as the money paid to 
enforcement personnel is taken away from other parts of the economy. Avoiding this 
theoretical debate, the question remains as to whether administrative costs can 
significantly alter the findings in this paper thus far.  
Borrowing Auriol and Walters definition of administration costs, μ percent of 
revenue collections resulting in a revenue change of 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 will cost 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 ∗ (1 − 𝜇𝜇) percent. 
The MCF estimates can be adjusted to account for the administration costs using the 
formula 1/(1 − 𝜇𝜇) ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀. Given that the highest percent of enforcement costs is 3.60, it 
seems unlikely that there would be meaningful changes in the MCF from enforcement 
costs of 1.0373. These calculations assume constant marginal cost of tax collection and 
that the costs of collection are consistent across instruments. This may not necessarily 
hold and some tax instruments may be less expensive to collect on than others. If this is 
the case, and the costs are large enough, they may re-order the MCF estimates. Using 
average MCF data we can calculate the cost of collection thresholds each instrument 
must surpass in order to become the highest MCF instrument.  
Table 7.1: Enforcement Thresholds 
Year D M E L K 
Average (positive values) 1.02 1.07 1.21 1.37 1.42 
Accounting for 3.60 
percent enforcement costs 1.06 1.11 1.26 1.42 1.47 
Threshold 31.00% 27.30% 18.10% 7.10% 3.60% 
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The first row in the table shows the average MCF across all countries. The second 
column shows these MCF adjusted to account for the most extreme enforcement costs, 
3.60 percent. The third row shows the enforcement cost threshold that would have to be 
reached for that tax instrument to supplant capital as having the largest MCF. Domestic 
taxation to have the highest MCF, the administration costs would have to be 31 percent 
(assuming all the other factors faced 3.60 percent administrative costs). Auriol and 
Warlters found Uganda to have the highest tax administration cost at 3.60 percent, it is 
highly implausible that these thresholds would be reached. We conclude from these 
thresholds that enforcement costs would not significantly change the findings in this 
paper. Further research is needed to examine the dynamics of tax enforcement costs in 




There are several conclusions to be drawn from these results. First, the vast 
majority of countries could enhance welfare through revenue neutral tax reform that 
lowers domestic taxes and raises trade taxes. This welfare gain could be offset by harm 
borne by consumers due to less variety from trade, or by producers due to reciprocal 
tariffs imposed by other countries. The MCF of domestic taxes is largely overshadowed 
by the high MCF for factor taxes. Welfare could be enhanced by a greater degree through 
the reduction of factor taxes (as opposed to domestic taxes) and the increase in trade or 
domestic taxes. The failure of countries to properly equilibrate the MCF across taxes 
suggests that redistribution trumps efficiency considerations for tax structure. Stiglitz 
(2009) would argue that this could be the welfare maximizing outcome given the 
implementation of welfare systems can be extremely costly and even more inefficient.  
From a broader perspective, this paper finds the MCF to be largely driven by the 
presence of informal sector. Using both calibrated measures of the informal economy and 
outside measures, there is a positive relationship between the MCF for a particular 
country and the size of the informal sector. A larger informal sector allows for easier 
substitution away from formal factors in the economy, towards untaxed factors and 
investment. This process increases the MCF as instruments with higher tax rates face a 
shrinking tax base due to business shifts into the informal sector. GDP and population are 
also found to be correlated with MCF. The results suggest a general negative relationship 
between GDP and the MCF, while population has a positive relationship on the MCF. 
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This implies that wealthier countries generally have lower MCF compared with poorer 
countries. Population, a proxy for country size, indicates that larger countries generally 
have higher MCF.  
The robustness of these results is somewhat questionable. This can be partially 
attributed to the generalized nature of the model and the highly aggregated data used as 
inputs. This generalization is necessary for a model so broadly applicable to a wide set of 
countries with significant variation in parameters. Future research conducted with more 
precise data and a more specific model should yield cleaner results. For the purposes of 




APPENDIX A: INPUT DATA 
Country  Year E M I RD RE RM RK RL TD TK TL GDPpc 
Albania 2014 28.25 47.25 24.92 5.00 0.00 0.64 1.55 1.39 0.20 0.15 0.23 4564 
Angola 2014 45.80 44.60 14.76 1.45 0.00 1.43 9.22 1.45 0.10 0.35 0.17 2759 
Antigua and Barbuda 2014 45.27 59.37 30.24 0.89 0.00 2.31 1.04 1.08 0.12 0.25 0.25 11732 
Armenia 2014 30.48 50.21 22.36 9.72 0.00 1.07 2.29 6.39 0.20 0.20 0.36 2382 
Bahamas 2014 43.93 57.02 23.54 0.01 0.12 6.90 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.01 20690 
Bahrain, Kingdom of 2013 73.65 46.25 16.38 0.01 0.00 0.93 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 18128 
Bangladesh 2013 20.61 27.08 28.51 3.22 0.00 2.41 2.00 0.87 0.15 0.28 0.25 750 
Belarus 2013 60.26 63.46 37.31 6.06 1.47 2.12 0.81 0.01 0.20 0.18 0.12 4998 
Belize 2012 63.47 65.13 13.16 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 12.50 0.25 0.25 4104 
Benin 2013 30.05 40.38 25.61 7.31 0.02 4.71 1.55 1.62 0.18 0.30 0.09 598 
Bolivia 2012 38.07 36.62 17.64 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.25 0.13 1372 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2014 33.90 56.90 19.82 5.00 0.00 0.00 1.15 1.50 0.17 0.10 0.10 3450 
Botswana 2014 49.81 43.30 31.88 4.02 0.00 11.05 5.28 0.01 0.12 0.22 0.25 7727 
Burkina Faso 2014 28.95 35.66 18.04 6.27 0.00 2.32 0.01 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.15 531 
Burundi 2013 8.48 34.72 19.57 4.94 0.02 1.04 2.35 1.23 0.18 0.20 0.30 158 
Cabo Verde 2012 31.50 60.30 40.20 9.57 0.00 4.37 2.75 3.47 0.15 0.25 0.23 2742 
Cambodia 2014 62.32 66.71 21.50 5.03 0.34 2.48 2.21 0.73 0.10 0.20 0.20 745 
Central African Rep. 2012 13.50 24.40 14.97 2.35 0.35 1.30 0.32 1.23 0.19 0.30 0.50 231 
China 2013 24.82 22.34 47.79 3.96 0.00 0.45 2.45 0.66 0.17 0.25 0.25 3866 
Colombia 2014 16.90 19.89 24.98 5.22 0.00 0.61 5.26 0.03 0.16 0.25 0.33 4549 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 2012 33.12 30.24 16.77 0.01 0.11 3.08 1.39 1.22 0.15 0.35 0.25 306 
Congo, Republic of 2012 83.80 60.30 16.77 1.95 0.00 1.13 1.44 1.04 0.16 0.24 0.25 2038 
Costa Rica 2014 32.18 34.33 21.93 4.75 0.02 0.65 2.47 1.31 0.13 0.30 0.15 5962 
Côte d'Ivoire 2014 43.39 39.41 18.81 1.51 2.03 4.94 1.33 2.00 0.18 0.20 0.25 1155 
Croatia 2013 43.04 42.62 20.43 5.00 0.00 0.35 1.93 0.42 0.25 0.20 0.40 10561 
Czech Republic 2014 83.75 76.76 22.41 5.00 0.00 0.00 2.10 2.31 0.21 0.19 0.22 14945 
Dominica 2014 34.06 47.56 15.89 8.91 0.00 2.39 1.67 2.26 0.15 0.03 0.20 6115 
Dominican Republic 2013 25.94 31.97 22.33 4.43 0.00 0.75 1.98 0.90 0.18 0.29 0.25 5101 
El Salvador 2013 26.37 45.58 15.10 7.79 0.00 0.82 3.26 1.60 0.13 0.30 0.30 3103 
Equatorial Guinea 2012 96.80 65.20 54.40 0.33 0.02 0.09 8.66 0.55 0.15 0.35 0.10 11576 
Ethiopia 2012 13.80 31.60 33.08 1.04 0.85 3.63 0.99 0.54 0.15 0.30 0.20 316 
Fiji 2013 56.60 69.40 25.76 9.43 0.06 4.13 2.74 1.82 0.15 0.20 0.20 3944 
Gambia, The 2012 33.83 48.13 30.16 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.32 0.35 435 
Georgia 2014 42.58 60.59 25.95 11.30 0.00 0.33 2.84 6.13 0.18 0.15 0.20 2254 
Germany 2014 45.94 39.42 17.70 3.74 0.00 0.00 0.59 4.05 0.19 0.30 0.45 39718 
Ghana 2012 36.89 54.04 32.94 4.57 0.13 3.83 1.79 1.97 0.15 0.25 0.25 775 
Greece 2012 23.41 27.75 13.69 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.23 0.20 0.45 18377 
Grenada 2014 26.06 43.55 25.82 7.42 0.00 2.37 1.85 1.93 0.15 0.30 0.30 6475 
Guatemala 2013 23.61 35.50 14.23 5.12 0.00 0.46 3.50 0.29 0.12 0.31 0.07 2380 
Honduras 2014 46.87 65.74 24.80 7.13 0.00 0.76 3.61 1.88 0.15 0.30 0.25 1495 
Iceland 2014 53.51 47.28 14.38 8.07 0.00 0.30 3.35 6.09 0.26 0.20 0.46 59693 
Indonesia 2012 23.85 23.19 34.74 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.25 0.30 1866 
Iraq 2014 41.53 22.33 26.10 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.23 0.28 0.01 0.15 0.05 2439 
Israel 2014 32.45 30.80 19.52 9.71 0.00 0.26 3.21 7.02 0.18 0.27 0.50 24541 
Jamaica 2014 31.26 53.25 18.47 4.20 0.00 7.59 3.28 5.97 0.17 0.25 0.25 5562 
Japan 2012 15.76 17.04 20.80 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.38 0.50 37595 
Jordan 2014 43.28 69.21 21.67 11.05 0.00 1.29 2.41 0.61 0.16 0.14 0.14 2878 
Kazakhstan 2014 40.94 26.95 28.37 3.10 3.91 0.72 6.62 0.08 0.12 0.20 0.10 5576 
Kenya 2013 19.51 33.39 18.26 4.10 0.00 1.28 3.84 4.43 0.16 0.30 0.30 649 
Korea 2014 51.63 45.64 28.91 4.15 0.00 0.59 2.92 3.76 0.10 0.22 0.24 24566 
Kuwait 2013 69.34 26.49 14.10 0.01 0.00 0.56 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.01 30147 
Kyrgyz Republic 2014 37.66 88.07 27.17 9.14 0.00 3.47 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.10 0.10 637 
Lao PDR 2014 40.45 49.68 30.00 3.81 0.33 1.61 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.24 0.12 794 
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Lebanon 2014 39.96 70.18 24.47 4.01 0.00 1.02 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.15 0.20 7315 
Lesotho 2013 40.40 101.20 33.81 8.73 1.33 0.00 3.26 8.71 0.14 0.25 0.35 979 
Liberia 2013 48.50 100.40 19.00 1.44 0.02 7.89 0.94 7.23 0.07 0.25 0.15 329 
Lithuania 2014 81.48 79.57 19.60 7.61 0.00 0.00 1.38 3.65 0.21 0.15 0.15 11074 
Macedonia, F.Y.R. of 2012 46.12 68.11 21.30 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.10 0.10 3917 
Madagascar 2012 26.76 39.06 17.63 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.20 0.20 0.21 271 
Malawi 2014 45.79 56.12 19.87 4.70 0.00 1.60 3.17 3.97 0.17 0.30 0.30 272 
Malaysia 2014 73.87 64.63 26.74 0.99 0.17 0.24 8.33 2.21 0.10 0.25 0.26 7304 
Maldives 2014 108.24 89.34 20.00 0.13 0.02 4.45 6.65 0.12 0.06 0.25 0.06 6154 
Mali 2013 30.17 48.24 19.31 6.12 0.00 2.07 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.30 0.22 495 
Mauritius 2014 49.82 62.11 23.19 6.73 0.00 0.32 2.32 1.82 0.15 0.15 0.15 7117 
Moldova 2014 36.84 73.66 22.69 11.47 0.00 1.27 1.64 0.71 0.20 0.12 0.18 1191 
Morocco 2014 34.26 46.62 34.32 8.11 0.00 0.84 4.51 3.75 0.20 0.30 0.38 2557 
Mozambique 2013 30.85 80.12 50.06 8.19 0.00 1.87 7.41 3.19 0.17 0.32 0.32 451 
Namibia 2012 41.48 55.68 23.38 5.75 0.00 11.94 4.59 6.47 0.15 0.34 0.28 4678 
Nepal 2014 12.20 44.39 28.88 5.24 0.06 3.32 2.36 1.13 0.13 0.20 0.15 426 
New Zealand 2012 30.91 28.66 20.24 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.28 0.33 29201 
Nicaragua 2014 42.33 59.29 18.99 6.33 0.00 0.65 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.30 0.20 1417 
Nigeria 2013 19.31 14.89 14.72 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.30 0.30 1092 
Pakistan 2014 12.17 20.21 13.99 3.96 0.00 0.00 0.06 3.45 0.17 0.34 0.30 819 
Palau 2014 63.15 87.77 53.00 0.01 0.21 4.43 0.01 3.73 0.15 0.04 0.12 9346 
Paraguay 2014 44.76 42.13 15.73 6.76 0.00 1.29 2.60 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.10 1979 
Peru 2014 22.25 23.77 27.76 6.89 0.00 0.31 5.00 1.99 0.18 0.30 0.30 6662 
Philippines 2014 26.44 30.92 19.14 2.25 0.00 2.99 3.68 2.29 0.12 0.30 0.32 1649 
Poland 2013 47.02 45.14 18.73 7.17 0.00 0.13 1.42 2.56 0.23 0.19 0.32 11305 
Portugal 2014 40.94 39.65 15.70 7.52 0.00 0.00 2.61 7.23 0.23 0.23 0.48 18300 
Russia 2014 30.09 22.91 20.46 5.64 6.37 1.10 0.56 0.01 0.18 0.20 0.13 6844 
Rwanda 2012 14.36 34.99 23.87 4.54 0.00 1.62 1.99 2.54 0.18 0.30 0.15 418 
Samoa 2014 28.24 52.45 9.00 9.20 0.00 2.85 2.46 3.13 0.15 0.27 0.27 2680 
Senegal 2012 17.59 43.95 29.76 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.30 0.20 809 
Serbia, Republic of 2012 33.39 53.62 21.07 10.99 0.00 2.36 1.27 2.72 0.20 0.15 0.15 4246 
Sierra Leone 2014 44.21 48.76 14.19 2.05 0.00 1.27 1.20 2.76 0.15 0.30 0.30 538 
Slovak Republic 2014 92.48 87.84 18.58 6.66 0.00 0.00 2.94 3.28 0.20 0.22 0.19 15727 
Solomon Islands 2014 39.50 39.90 18.95 1.01 5.82 6.13 5.05 4.72 0.05 0.30 0.40 1954 
South Africa 2014 31.25 33.13 19.36 6.79 0.00 1.03 5.40 9.56 0.14 0.28 0.40 6086 
Sri Lanka 2014 22.33 30.88 31.97 2.81 0.00 2.03 1.00 0.31 0.12 0.28 0.24 2136 
St. Kitts and Nevis 2014 38.47 47.31 26.89 6.13 0.00 2.19 1.78 3.18 0.17 0.33 0.10 14133 
St. Lucia 2014 44.70 50.26 30.65 8.73 0.00 2.75 1.71 2.73 0.15 0.30 0.15 7328 
St. Vincent  2014 25.07 56.49 32.32 7.01 0.00 2.50 2.04 3.63 0.15 0.33 0.33 6486 
Suriname 2012 46.55 30.91 5.89 3.85 0.06 2.29 4.55 1.96 0.10 0.36 0.18 4569 
Switzerland 2012 65.11 56.85 20.98 3.40 0.00 0.17 1.42 1.53 0.08 0.18 0.40 58997 
Syria 2012 32.29 49.94 19.40 0.01 0.00 1.35 2.29 0.01 0.02 0.28 0.22 4151 
Tanzania 2013 25.38 40.69 32.73 4.46 0.06 1.47 3.03 3.85 0.18 0.30 0.30 601 
Togo 2013 48.05 68.53 18.38 7.04 0.09 4.53 1.53 1.22 0.18 0.27 0.35 437 
Trinidad and Tobago 2012 88.00 39.70 13.99 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.25 0.01 14275 
Tunisia 2012 48.95 58.13 24.29 6.30 0.05 1.70 4.37 4.14 0.18 0.30 0.35 3953 
Turkey 2014 27.45 32.26 19.87 5.95 0.00 0.40 1.99 4.35 0.18 0.20 0.35 8872 
Uganda 2014 18.37 28.46 25.44 3.58 0.00 1.22 0.68 1.95 0.18 0.30 0.40 422 
Ukraine 2014 49.65 53.14 8.16 8.87 0.01 0.79 2.55 0.81 0.20 0.18 0.17 2081 
United Kingdom 2014 28.77 30.69 15.05 6.94 0.00 0.00 2.46 9.09 0.20 0.21 0.45 40968 
Uruguay 2012 27.34 29.38 23.57 10.63 0.00 1.12 5.29 0.03 0.22 0.25 0.30 8019 
Uzbekistan 2014 23.41 27.30 25.00 4.95 0.00 1.03 1.58 0.90 0.20 0.08 0.16 960 
Zimbabwe 2012 32.90 63.20 14.17 7.00 6.00 6.00 3.56 9.00 0.15 0.26 0.46 475 
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APPENDIX B: ROBUSTNESS TESTING RESULTS 
Country Differences from the Base Case 
Albania 2 
Angola  8 
Antigua and Barbuda 2 
Armenia 11 
Bahamas 15 






Bosnia and Herzegovina 8 
Botswana 10 
Burkina Faso 9 
Burundi 0 
Cabo Verde 12 
Cambodia 1 




Congo, Republic of  11 
Costa Rica 4 
Côte d'Ivoire 8 
Croatia 8 
Czech Republic 11 
Dominica 2 
Dominican Republic 2 
El Salvador 2 
Equatorial Guinea 10 
Ethiopia 16 
Fiji 2 



















Kyrgyz Republic 9 
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New Zealand 3 
Nicaragua 6 
Nigeria 9 












Sierra Leone 4 
Slovak Republic 9 
Solomon Islands 15 
South Africa 14 
Sri Lanka 8 
St. Kitts and Nevis 9 
St. Lucia 1 
















APPENDIX C: INFORMAL ECONOMY, 
 BASELINE GDP ADJUSTED 
Country XU Schneider et. al. 
Albania 73.80 34.3 
Angola 77.90 46.6 
Antigua and Barbuda 77.10 
Armenia 45.43 44 
Bahamas 90.61 26.5 
Bahrain, Kingdom of 65.14 17.9 
Bangladesh 81.09 35.3 
Belarus 31.51 46.4 
Belize 79.01 42.9 
Benin 52.89 49.8 
Bolivia 98.55 66.1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 68.38 33.6 
Botswana 40.39 33 
Burkina Faso 66.01 40.5 
Burundi 93.41 39.5 
Cabo Verde 18.49 35.4 
Cambodia 20.08 48.7 
Central African Republic 109.08 45 
China 57.41 12.7 
Colombia 73.49 37.3 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 103.49 47.3 
Congo, Republic of 43.27 46.4 
Costa Rica 59.56 25.8 
Côte d'Ivoire 82.96 45.2 
Croatia 67.35 32.1 
Czech Republic 27.06 18.4 
Dominica 36.39 
Dominican Republic 77.26 31.9 
El Salvador 44.87 45.1 
Equatorial Guinea 26.23 31.4 
Ethiopia 101.34 38.7 
Fiji 6.34 32.4 
Gambia, The 94.77 44.3 
Georgia 16.74 65.8 
Germany 67.83 16 
Ghana 55.75 40.6 
Greece 115.31 27.5 
Grenada 47.97 
Guatemala 67.54 50.5 
Honduras 33.30 48.3 
Iceland 47.12 15.6 
Indonesia 96.69 18.9 
Iraq 85.81 
Israel 38.43 22 
Jamaica 76.35 34.8 
Japan 115.58 11 
Jordan 13.44 18.5 
Kazakhstan 57.42 41.1 
Kenya 86.20 33.2 
Korea 32.92 26.8 
Kuwait 69.03 19.3 
Kyrgyz Republic 11.85 40.4 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 46.95 29.6 
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Lebanon 50.95 33.1 
Lesotho 20.92 30.5 
Liberia 69.89 44.2 
Lithuania 15.58 32 
Macedonia, F.Y.R. of 90.95 37.6 
Madagascar 109.79 40.8 
Malawi 58.09 41.8 
Malaysia 50.80 30.9 
Maldives 33.12 29.5 
Mali 65.94 40.7 
Mauritius 34.25 22.7 
Moldova 30.62 
Morocco 42.62 34.9 
Mozambique 32.84 
Namibia 48.98 30.3 
Nepal 70.39 36.7 
New Zealand 102.69 12.4 
Nicaragua 46.93 44.6 
Nigeria 116.39 
Pakistan 98.40 35.7 
Palau 60.42 
Paraguay 19.65 38.8 
Peru 59.15 58 
Philippines 87.22 41.6 
Poland 51.63 27.2 
Portugal 57.36 23 
Russia 65.76 43.8 
Rwanda 86.93 
Samoa 44.94 
Senegal 109.99 43.8 
Serbia, Republic of 36.24 
Sierra Leone 80.37 45.6 
Slovak Republic 10.18 18.1 
Solomon Islands 75.46 33.6 
South Africa 48.35 27.3 
Sri Lanka 75.66 43.9 
St. Kitts and Nevis 50.46 
St. Lucia 17.59 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 48.90 
Suriname 56.57 37.8 
Switzerland 26.37 8.5 
Syria 103.42 19 
Tanzania 70.70 56.4 
Togo 44.81 
Trinidad and Tobago 53.40 33.4 
Tunisia 44.34 37.2 
Turkey 67.84 31.3 
Uganda 87.25 42.3 
Ukraine 41.78 49.7 
United Kingdom 67.61 12.5 
Uruguay 44.71 50.6 
Uzbekistan 76.35 
Zimbabwe 54.23 61.8 
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APPENDIX D: INFORMAL ECONOMY, 
 NO BASELINE GDP ADJUSTMENT 
Country XU Schneider et. al. 
Albania 26.73 34.3 
Angola 30.14 46.6 
Antigua and Barbuda 31.89 
Bahamas 44.25 26.5 
Bahrain, Kingdom of 19.40 17.9 
Bangladesh 33.41 35.3 
Belize 31.79 42.9 
Benin 5.81 49.8 
Bolivia 50.76 66.1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 21.03 33.6 
Burkina Faso 17.94 40.5 
Burundi 44.93 39.5 
Central African Republic 60.11 45 
China 11.12 12.7 
Colombia 25.06 37.3 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 55.26 47.3 
Costa Rica 11.98 25.8 
Côte d'Ivoire 35.60 45.2 
Croatia 20.27 32.1 
Dominican Republic 29.42 31.9 
Ethiopia 53.99 38.7 
Gambia, The 48.64 44.3 
Germany 20.43 16 
Ghana 10.30 40.6 
Greece 66.49 27.5 
Grenada 0.83 
Guatemala 18.93 50.5 
Indonesia 49.41 18.9 
Iraq 38.57 
Jamaica 28.70 34.8 
Japan 66.74 11 
Kazakhstan 10.69 41.1 
Kenya 37.83 33.2 
Kuwait 22.08 19.3 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 1.23 29.6 
Lebanon 4.61 33.1 
Macedonia, F.Y.R. of 44.41 37.6 
Madagascar 61.68 40.8 
Malawi 11.24 41.8 
Malaysia 7.56 30.9 
Mali 18.29 40.7 
Namibia 2.45 30.3 
Nepal 23.05 36.7 
New Zealand 54.70 12.4 
Nigeria 67.18 
Pakistan 49.23 35.7 
Peru 11.30 58 
Philippines 39.05 41.6 
Poland 4.54 27.2 
Portugal 9.48 23 
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Russia 17.52 43.8 
Rwanda 38.96 
Senegal 62.93 43.8 
Sierra Leone 32.51 45.6 
Solomon Islands 27.97 33.6 
South Africa 0.42 27.3 
Sri Lanka 28.53 43.9 
St. Kitts and Nevis 4.14 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2.73 
Suriname 7.38 37.8 
Syria 55.87 19 
Tanzania 24.20 56.4 
Trinidad and Tobago 8.68 33.4 
Turkey 19.82 31.3 
Uganda 39.30 42.3 
United Kingdom 19.10 12.5 
Uzbekistan 28.49 
Zimbabwe 6.14 61.8 
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